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ABSTRACT  
REHABILITATION AFTER ARMED CONFLICT
Armed conflict (war and near war) is widespread - over 50 countries and 500 million people 
are afflicted including large countries with sub-national near wars (e.g. Nigeria, Mexico, 
Indonesia); on all continents except Australia and Antarctica.
The human and economic costs o f war are very high. In SSA at least 10 million persons are 
dead (largely o f war linked famine, loss o f health service and water access, dislocation/forced 
migration) with over 2 million each in Mozambique and Sudan. For SSA as a whole 1980-2000 
loss o f GDP growth usually 1% to 2% annually i.e. with no wars 33% higher GDP probable.
Ending war - or a lull o f exhaustion or fragile settlement - is first step in process of 
making/sustaining peace, that process has three pillars - Reconciliation, Reconstruction, 
Rehabilitation. These interact (positively or negatively).
Rehabilitation includes:
• livelihood recovery to bring household incomes - especially o f war displaced and post war 
demobilised back to or above poverty line.
• basic service - law and order (largely through user friendly police and primary courts), 
primary education, water, primary health and - less uniformly - agricultural extension 
restoration.
• local infrastructure renewal to support livelihood recovery and service provision and to 
make possible market access as part o f livelihood restoration.
• safety nets to alleviate calamity (natural disaster) impact to sustain household capacity to 
continue rehabilitation when the drought (or flood) has passed.
Because it is usually relevant to 50% of households and frequently for high shares o f national or 
regional output, exports, food supply fiscal revenue, rehabilitation should be a central theme in 
strategic macro economic policy and programming.
Because post war contexts differ significantly from post calamity (natural disaster) or economic 
(polic. terms o f trade, debt, etc.) crises rehabilitation does diverge significantly from poverty
reduction focused growth in poor countries which have not faced substantial armed conflict on 
their own territory.
Rehabilitation is a major strand in governance. State legitimacy and public 
acceptance/mobilisation depend to a large extent on government capacity to delivery: the 
opportunity to raise household incomes; basic services (not least security to go about daily 
lives/livelihoods without violent disruption i.e. law and order), basic infrastructure and market 
access.
Rehabilitation is a process not an event. Phasing and timing are crucial. The initial three 
priorities are:
a. "going home" which - usually virtually literally - is the goal o f an average o f three 
quarters or more o f displaced persons;
b. restoring food security out o f own production (or sale o f other products plus waged work 
to buy food) thus replacing food aid except in calamity years;
c. initial service/infrastructure restoration selected after consultation with users to be on 
which roads, schools, water units clinics should be restored first.
As a process, rehabilitation is not a smooth, ever broadening highway. It is - because post war 
economies are fragile - subject to calamity and external economic shocks (and occasionally 
windfalls e.g. 1999-2000 oil prices). Further the roots o f war are rarely eliminated before, at or 
soon after the cessation o f full scale war so that regression into violence or even a full scale 
return to war are only too possible (e.g. Rwanda, Congo, Angola - severally and jointly).
Contexts vary so much - in history, social capital, society, political culture, weakness vs. failure 
o f state, degrees o f  underlying bitterness and distrust among combating fractions, economic base, 
role o f diaspora - that detailed generalisations are risky. The easy assumptions that Mozambique 
and Angola were very similar and Somalia and Somaliland nearly homogenous have proven 
totally misleading. Mozambique and Somaliland are success processes while Angola and - even 
more - Somalia are the reverse, indeed are yet to emerge from armed violence.
Rehabilitation is not replication. Both war causing and war caused realities prevent that. So do 
changes in approach - e.g. to primary health care - since armed violence begun (or the basic 
service structure began to disintegrate which in Sierra Leone is a third o f a century ago). Gender
is perceived - not least by women in war torn countries - very differently from a quarter century 
ago.
However in a different sense "going home" and "recovering" that which was valued and lost are 
basic goals for most war afflicted households. They need to be part o f the rehabilitation process 
in priority and phasing setting and monitoring/revision as well as mobilisation and operation.
Rehabilitation does not stand alone - it interacts with Reconciliation and Reconstruction. The 
last includes renewal (probably with more structural changes from pre war) o f major 
infrastructure and directly productive units within a central macro economic strategy and policy 
which avoids unsustainable fiscal, external price, nutritional, basic service and poverty 
imbalances. Equally however, unless Reconstruction (including strategic resource allocation) 
treats Rehabilitation as a central priority it is almost certain to stall, erode and ultimately 
collapse.
R.H. Green 
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REHABILITATION: Toward Sustainable Peace and 
Reconciliation for Redevelopment
by Reginald Herbold Green
Development is about human beings. They need 
four things. First is water. It is the first thing 
needed to live. Without it a plant, an animal, 
or a baby dies. Second is food. Without enough 
o f it, life is miserable and short. Third, once water 
and food are won is health - otherwise the human 
being becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a 
human being has water, food and health he needs to 
learn to open new horizons and unlock new possibilities. 
And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without these 
none o f the four basic needs can be sustained
- Somali Elder 
Baidoa, 1995
To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere
REHABILITATION: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY1
Rehabilitation after armed conflict (sub-national, national or transborder) is o f increasing 
importance both in national rebuilding and in international cooperation policy and resource 
allocation, fhe reason is partly a rise in humanitarian concern, partly an increased realisation that 
lack of rehabilitation can result in or contribute to renewed conflict and partly the reality that over 
fifty countries - in all continents, slightly under half in sub-Saharan Africa - with over 500 million 
people have recently experienced or are in the throes o f sub-national or national civil wars or of 
wars crossing national frontiers. If cases such as Mexico (Chiapas plus), Indonesia (beyond East 
Timor), Nigeria (Delta) and India (Kashmir) are included the total (including only directly affected 
regions) passes 600 million. On the narrower definition, the probable loss o f life (including deaths 
resulting from war caused famine, dislocation and collapse of health - water - sanitary services) 
over the last two decades o f  the 20th century probably exceeds 10 million and the cumulative loss 
of output $200,000 million.2
Rehabilitation is part of a triad-Reconciliation among combatant or ex-combatant factions and 
those (often the majority) alienated from both (or all), Reconstruction of major infrastructure and 
production units and o f macro economic sustainability and Rehabilitation of household 
livelihoods and access to basic services as well as to local infrastructure. The three R-R-R 
elements interact - reconciliation and religitimisation (or legitimisation) o f governance are crucial 
to sustained rehabilitation as are major reconstruction works and macro economic viability. But, 
without ability to provide effective basic service and local infrastructure access, a government will 
find it hard to sustain - or even attain - legitimacy just as it will if  most households are unable to 
regain decent livelihoods. Similarly a recovery based only on a few large unit enclaves, even if 
nominally economically sustainable, is unlikely to have a long political or social life expectancy.
While this study concentrates on post war rehabilitation, elements of rehabilitation can - and 
should - be incorporated into wartime survival oriented strategies’ and into programmes for 
less affected urban and rural areas during wars. In refugee/displaced person contexts camp self 
organisation for health, education water and child support programmes using camp members could 
be practiced more widely as could at least partial provisioning by small farming activities.4
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Rehabilitation - like other aspects o f R-R-R is a process rather than an event. It is not - much as 
this might be desirable - a steady, unidirectional highroad because, while war to peace and abject 
devastation to modest rebuilt sufficiency are logically continua, setbacks from renewed outbreaks 
o f violence, from other exogenous shocks (as varied as drought and terms o f trade) and o f policy 
and programme errors, causing slide backs as well as drives forward on the continua, are much 
more probable than stable peace building, benign physical and economic environmental climates 
and near perfect public and private decision taking in respect to rehabilitation/
Rehabilitation - like reconciliation and reconstruction - cannot usefully be read as simple 
replication of the pre war situation. At least in the civil or multi country regional cases.6 the pre 
war context almost always contained elements leading to rising lends o f tension contribution to the 
outbreak o f armed violence.7 Even when these were by no means purely or even dominantly 
economic, rehabilitation programmes may be able to increase cross group social capital through 
creating mutual economic or basic service interests8 and/or addressing livelihood and 
service/infrastructure access grievances. Further war creates two new contextual groups - female 
headed households (especially bereaved ones) many o f whom have severe adult able bodied 
hands to mouths to feed ratio constraints, which need to be addressed if they are to climb out of 
absolute poverty and demobilised combatants who have often been desocialised and usually have 
few skills other than the use o f weaponry and few assets other than tools o f violence, implying that 
in the absence o f programmes directly addressing their livelihood creation needs either armed 
banditry or renewed war or semi war outbreaks are likely.9
However, avoiding pure replication should not be interpreted as requiring a tabula rasa approach 
and the delays o f totally reconceptualising and replanning as if  nothing valid but existed before and 
been lost during war. For exam ple:10
1. most refugees/displaced persons want to 'go home' (often very literally indeed);
2. most small farming households wish to resume farming and most urban or rural 
employees to get wage employment (whether formal or ‘informal’ again;
3. criticisms of pre war health, water, primary and continuing education, law and order, veterinary 
and (perhaps less uniformly) agricultural extension services are usually dominantly as to
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inadequate quality or quantity not disagreement as to their importance or demands for 
total reconceptualisation.
That suggests that first steps toward rehabilitation can use even limited baseline data plus quick 
consultation with intended beneficiaries to identify and to prioritise a substantial body of 
programmes and projects o f  types for which experience does exist.11
Conceptualisation, Literature, Practice12
Internationally, rehabilitation conceptualisation literature - and less uniformly practice - have 
grown up as offshoots o f calamity (natural disaster) relief and reconstruction work, of conflict 
theory and - more recently - of poverty alleviation (relief) and reduction thinking. This history 
has led to distinct limitations and in particular to marginalisation into the relief/safety net and the 
micro/NGO categories with exclusion from central macro and sectoral policy and programming 
and from governmental strategic priority coordination.
Arguably it has had further - and also marginalising - consequences in:
a. inadequate examination o f interactions with other aspects o f achieving an exit from armed 
conflict e.g. recreation o f  respected user-friendly police and protecting households from 
violence.
b. explaining how ex-combatants can be integrated/reintegrated into civilian livelihoods and 
social/community relationships;13
c. recognising the value o f identifying elements which have worked in other emerging from 
conflicts settings - and why - but
d. avoiding simple generalisation14, even from multiple cases, because contextual (both historic 
and geographic as well as econom ic)11' realities are complex, divergent and likely to offer both 
'bridge out' and 'no through road' signals for rehabilitation scenarios; as well as
e. generalisng somewhat facilely from one or two cases or causally ambiguous correlations.
Nationally conceptualisation has often been intuitive rather than formal and/or limited to 
identifying a set or shopping list o f projects or programmes rather than a strategy. This situation is 
encouraged by external actor - not least the World Bank - failure to respond to strategic approaches
putting war afflicted livelihood, basic service and infrastructure rehabilitation at the core o f 
political economic strategy from macro through local levels.16 There are exceptions - though only 
in M ozambique17 is there a single document outlining and quantifying rehabilitation strategy and 
that was simply ignored (more than head on rejected) by external funders. Ethiopia's diverse relief, 
reconstruction, basic services programmes arguably are an R-R-R strategic approach in a country in 
which most zones have not suffered serious physical destruction or massive war forced human 
displacement. Eritrea's centrally controlled strategy and practice for state creation and national 
reintegration does pay specific attention to reversing displacement and organising resettlement to 
improve livelihood - basic service access - infrastructure. Somaliland - because o f its limited state 
resource base and lack o f large official external flows (as a result o f non-recognition) has focussed 
on recreating security (army-police-courts), political legitimacy (melding traditional and modern), 
basic service access (coordinating INGO, international agency, domestic social sector and state 
actors) and - as external support has become less constricted - infrastructure 
rehabilitation/reconstruction as a minimalist conceptualised strategy which is more evident in 
dialogue than documentation.
The influence of INGO's (international non-governmental organisations) on conceptualisation and 
practice has been substantial and less than wholly benign;
1. the link to calamity relief and rapid recovery from - e.g. - drought has limited recognition that 
rehabilitation can rarely proceed in a straight line or be viewed as a 1 to 2 year programme 
because exit from armed conflict is substantially different from exit from drought;
2. because INGO's before the 1980's worked largely with community level projects nominally 
phased for handover after a limited period, their particular orientations and skills are not ideal 
for strategic macro programming from national through local level nor with effective 
collaboration with, or acting primarily as support groups for, national or local government or 
for domestic social actors/civil society groups (e.g. churches, mosques, trade and farmers 
unions, women's groups and community or district associations);
3. as a direct result o f the temporal urgency o f disaster (armed conflict) relief work and the 
pervasive - albeit very uneven - weaknesses o f central and local government and of domestic 
social actors plus, perhaps, their own bureaucratic, social capital and partner procedures and 
preferences - INGO'S have been funded from the North as alternatives to, more than
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complements to or support groups for, domestic actors. However necessary this may be 
under conditions o f chaos and extreme conflict18 it frequently corrodes, fragments and 
delegitimises domestic actors, prevents national R-R-R strategy and practice from being and 
being seen to be dominant and creates serious problems o f disengagement if de facto  INGO and 
aid agency parallel government structures outside domestic accountability and also o f financial 
transparency are created, expanded and sustained.14
One clear problem - intellectually and for practitioners - is the limited interaction between postwar 
political and social economic rebuilding and rehabilitation analysis and programming which is
largely weak on political rehabilitation conceptualisation and on links to conflict causation and
20process' and conflict theory and analysis which is less strong on past (or potentially post) war and 
on the contribution o f economic and basic services programming in the transition to peace.21 To 
some extent projects such as COPE22 and "Comprehending and M astering Conflict"23 do move 
these two strands closer together. Whether they do so by synthesis or simply setting side by side 
may be more contentious.
Main Themes and Issues
As o f 2000's end the intellectual and operational position in respect to Rehabilitation can be 
summarised relatively briefly:
a. the economic and political important o f addressing the livelihoods o f literally scores o f millions 
in war ravaged economies in scores o f countries is widely recognised, but
b. integration o f rehabilitation into sectoral regional24 and macro economic strategy formulation 
and prioritisation is rare,
c. partly because the origins o f attention to rehabilitation tend to treat it as a package o f short 
term, micro safety nets under an emergency rubric not as a more central part o f political 
economic renewal; and therefore
d. projects (whether in livelihood basic services or/and local infrastructure access) tend to be 
small, temporary add ons to central macro economic planning and policy, often contracted out 
to fNGO's and other uncoordinated external actions;
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e. varied levels o f attention to attempted generalisations (sometimes either from one example or 
somewhat ambiguous empirical correlations) and to specific contextualities whether historical, 
social, political or/and economic; resulting in
f. a certain confusion as to the nature o f substantive agreements and disagreements and to the 
applicability o f conceputalisation in one context to another.2>
The main topics o f this paper address ways forward from this relatively unsatisfactory 
(intellectually, let alone for persons emerging from conflict) position, which is nonetheless much 
less unsatisfactory than a decade ago when R-R-R received minimal intellectual or specific 
programming attention.
1. Rehabilitation as Process: Parameters and Interactions;
2. Main Elements in Postwar Rehabilitation;
3. Recurrent Themes and Issues;
4. Country Rehabilitation Heads, Vignettes, Panorama;
5. Flexibility and Margins: Managing Uncertainty.
followed by a brief resume o f points and parameters with more than single country applicability.
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PARAM ETERS AND LINKAGES: REHABILITATION AS PROCESS
Rehabilitation is a process (as are Reconciliation and Reconstruction) not a once for all event. It
is also a problematic process in that both setbacks in the decline/suspension/ending o f armed 
violence and damaging external shocks (whether literally climatic - e.g. drought - or relating to 
economic climate - e.g. terms o f trade, donor fashions) - are highly probable. Perhaps it would be 
more illuminating to describe it as processes in the plural -  over time and in different 
regions/districts/zones within one country and among countries at any one time.
Rehabilitation can - probably should under most circumstances - be a component during wars in 
programmes which are primarily survival support.26 In the first place there are frequently some 
major towns and rural areas not physically overwhelmed by war, but suffering from consequential 
economic (livelihood) and budgetary (basic services) indirect impact. In Mozambique after initial 
setbacks, mother and child care and primary education in urban areas were pushed beyond 1980 
levels and primary health care restored to them while water and sanitation coverage more or less 
kept pace with urban expansion. Livelihood rehabilitation/augmentation was less marked but 
opening o f large peri urban green zone (allotment) areas and positive preference for women in 
respect o f some allocation processes were important for nutrition (originally in own food grown, 
later indirectly via cash earned) levels o f a not insignificant proportion o f very poor households.27
Second, displaced person and refugee settlements do offer opportunities for maintaining at least 
some independent livelihood capacity and for largely displacee staffed basic service provision.
Most camps afford some opportunities for agricultural or artisinal production and some residents 
qualified to provide primary education, health services and basic pure water and sanitation 
facilities. The potential varies with camp location, general area security, stability o f population and 
degree o f self organisation by residents (as well as o f the goals o f the internal leadership).28 In 
Angola and Zambia, SW APO camps were highly organised in respect to basic service provision, 
artisinal production (including vehicle repair and small scale construction) and education to 
underpin and build beyond ongoing service and livelihood levels. Agricultural production was 
much less successful except when linked to child nutrition.29
II
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I he three reasons why rehabilitation has usually played a lower role than would have been possible 
and desirable in refugee/displacee contexts are:
1. relatively high bureaucratic concern with controlling rather than empowering 
displacees/refugees and frequently underestimation o f their skill and organisational capacity;
2. lack o f finance, UNHCR, WFP or governmental, to do more than provide minimal - or 
subminimal - food, shelter, water and basic medical care plus vaccination;
3. leaderships (whether in or outside the refugee/displacee groups) who have objectives and 
priorities quite different from Rehabilitation (or indeed Reconciliation).
Similarly Rehabilitation is likely to remain relevant to some zones and population groups well after 
the overall national political and social economic situation can no longer usefully be defined in 
terms o f the post war. Arguably this is the case in much o f both Uganda and Somaliland as o f 
2000. In some zones peace and security came much later than in others (or remain elusive). For 
some groups - e.g. ex combatants 'warehoused' in the Somaliland armed forces beyond its 
estimated operational needs - re-entry into civilian livelihoods has proven exceedingly difficult 
whether for overall economic or retraining cost reasons.
However, the main thrust o f this paper turns on the period after (or during a lull which it is hoped 
to extend and make permanent) war during which R-R-R are central to most households and 
geographic areas even if not necessarily to Gross Domestic Product.
Conditions Conducive To Full Scale Rehabilitation
Strategic components include:
1. cessation, full suspension or a substantial and relatively long lull in armed violence;
2. relative peace and stability interacting with the reemergence o f credible law, order and justice 
systems as perceived by residents;
3. governmental priority to reducing proportions o f households in absolute poverty and near 
absolute lack o f access to basic services and local infrastructure combined with institutional, 
personnel and financial resources to act on that priority to give it credibility;^1
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4. effective demobilisation o f ex combatants into functioning civil society and civilian economy 
contexts, not into banditry and poverty;
5. an ongoing process o f  reconciliation (usually multifaceted not simply between two ’sides');
6. a functioning macro economic strategy able to provide a framework within which reconciliation 
could be pursued (including rehabilitation o f large scale infrastructure and production units);
7. limited calamities (natural shocks such as drought or flood as well as external economic 
debacles whether on terms o f trade or donor preferences as to countries or programmes) and 
catastrophes (reversion to armed violence over substantial areas) combined with at least basic 
'trampoline' type survival safety nets to allow households to snap back once the shocks had 
abated."2
These conditions are by no means absolute preconditions - the outlook for R-R-R would be 
very' bleak if all had to be met in advance or throughout the whole country in all sectors.
However, the more which are blatantly not met, the less likely emergence from war toward a 
process leading to peace. Once that process starts it can operate cumulatively with attainment of 
one condition facilitating advance on others. By the same token even relatively favourable initial 
conditions on several can erode rapidly if rehabilitation is not visibly begun and/or does not begin 
to produce visible (to war impacted households) results - not least the ability to 'go home' - within 
perhaps 18 to 24 months.
The type o f preceding war and the nature o f its conclusion appears to influence the climate for 
rehabilitation . A liberation war - from perceived colonial rule, e.g. Somaliland, Namibia , 
Mozambique to 1975) - combined with a serious effort to build legitimate government structures 
and political processes is probably the most favourable context. A post independence civil war 
ended by genuine mediation and a broadly accepted election may - e.g. Mozambique after 1992 - 
also create a relatively favourable context whereas an unresolved conflict (even if  a formal 'peace 
agreement' is nominally in place) - e.g. Sierra Leone, SomaliaJJ is very weak ground for 
Rehabilitation (not least because it is likely to be characterised both by repetitive outbursts of 
armed violence or worse and by near total absence o f reconciliation).
Beyond this rather general parameter list - and in detail even within it - the conditions for and 
course of Rehabilitation processes is highly contextual. What is needed depends to a large part
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on what has been lost and is seen to be a priority for regaining as well as on w hat remains and 
can be used as a base for initial winning back.
Perceived history - which can diabolise but can also, perhaps more positively, gild portions o f the 
past - is highly relevant to how robust a context exists for rehabilitation as well as (more obviously) 
for reconciliation. For example the somewhat roseate vision o f later colonial self governance 
public service and service provision model and hybrid parliamentary/elders system as recalled from 
the 1950's34 has been at the heart o f rebuilding legitimacy and the operational as well as the 
symbolic and political aspects o f governance in Somaliland.
Rehabilitation (like other not war/not peace and postwar processes) exists in time. The past 
necessarily informs the present - especially the perceived past even if'objectively ' inaccurate. The 
present informs the future and believed perceptions o f the future affect the present. Tegitimate 
institutions and processes - especially those with historic legitimacy and renewed life (in a renewed 
or mutated form) from reconciliation - determine or at least influence what is possible how and 
how fast.
While rehabilitation - like reconciliation and governance - is a step by step iterative 'project' or 
process focusing on items identified as both high priority and high immediate possibility, an 
overall strategic frame or ' project' of medium term future goals is usually fairly crucial to 
mobilisation and to efficient deployment of resources. The caveat is that rehabilitation - both as 
to setbacks and as to unforeseen possibilities - is even more uncertain and in more need o f flexible 
implementation and programme revision than non-war economic and social planning and 
programming.
Initial Elements
What elements should have temporal priority in a rehabilitation process is in large measure a 
contextual question. However, four generalisations appear to hold widely:
1. because war leads to large scale displacement o f people and because most (whether rural or 
urban)^ wish to return to approximately (or even literally) the places from which they have 
been forced to flee-’6 return home is usually a vital early step in rehabilitation. Until it happens
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rebuilding livelihoods and providing permanent (as opposed to camp) access to basic services 
is either impossible or small scale;
2. to be viable, return home requires security' from violent interference with normal life
whether by rebels, border raiders, bandits, 'protecting' troops, police or officials operated with a 
security force (usually civilian police37 except for combating formed rebels) and a primary 
court system which do have civilian credit-credibility;
3. building toward food security both in respect to physical supply and national balances and to 
household entitlements and food balances. Both the breadth (proportion) and depth (shortfall 
from minimum acceptable level) o f food shortages in SSA are closely related to present and 
historic presence or absence o f war. ’8 The direct (production) and indirect (entitlement) gains 
from peace, return home and perceived security can be large and rapid e.g. within 5 years of 
1992 (Rome Agreements) Mozambique had regained national food balance in coarse grains and 
most returnees could feed themselves, while also selling some food (and/or industrial crops) 
thereby strengthening commerce, transport and urban production with consequent multiplier 
entitlement effects. Even in the predominantly pastoral economy o f Somaliland small stock 
herd levels, sales and exports as well as crop production regained pre war (1985) levels by 5 or 
6 years after the 1991 victory over the Barre regime's occupation army even though substantial 
(but lesser and intermittent) insecurity was endemic in many pastoral areas until 1996;
4. basic services which were widely accessible39 and highly valued before the war are also likely 
to be high on returnees' demand lists/tests o f the competence and legitimacy o f the state. The 
most usual high priorities (in order) are primary health services, nearby water supplies for 
households (sometimes for livestock as well human use) and (perhaps less uniformly and with a 
slightly more relaxed time frame for restoration) primary education.
These heads meet the tests o f rapid visible payoff to large numbers o f households as perceived by 
them and are usually at least in large part attainable even within very tight resource constraints 
neither o f which holds true for Reconstruction o f major infrastructure or large production units.40
The initial rehabilitation targets will usually be in large (even predominant) measure 
replacement/revival/renewal o f what existed before, because that is how most war displaced 
people especially in rural areas, see return home, restoration o f food security/entitlements and
regaining access to basic services. They do wish to regain what was lost - and - if asked - can 
usually spell out what has been lost, which parts are most urgently needed back and what particular 
changes are seen as immediately needed. It is in subsequent processual steps (and even more in 
reconstruction and reconciliation)41 that changes and transformation diverging from pre war 
services and local infrastructure become more important.
This is not to say that certain new conditions -  often, e.g. up to 25% to 33% versus 5% prewar 
female headed households and the effective demise o f the right o f each adult woman to 1 use and on 
some male headed household allocation - may not require immediate attention. However, when 
they do, even a quick consultation process is likely to raise - if less likely to offer agreed 
approaches to - the relevant issues.
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DEEPENING, BROADENING, REVIEWING THE PROCESS
While it is important to begin Rehabilitation — and associated Reconciliation and Reconstruction - 
programming rapidly, it is desirable also to plot out tentative strategic targets and time scales. In 
principle - though not often in practice (with Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe partial 
exceptions), the R-R-R process, goals, sequences and dated targets can be mapped out before 
peace is won. If it is not done then, a similar exercise is appropriate parallel to initial action.
The intrinsic difficulties confronting such an exercise are twofold:
a. working through goals and means beyond and/or diverging from replication requires data 
collecting, analysis and pilot project testing which ranges from identifying and broadening 
national or regional best practice (especially in agriculture) through identification, 
screening, importation and adaptation o f experience outside the country to approaches 
which may draw on varied experiences but are basically new departures. Coffee 
management (as to fertilisation, shade, inter-cropping, harvesting) can be an example of the 
first, micro-credit o f the second and pastoral paramedical services o f the third (albeit a half 
remembered precedent existed in Somaliland from the 1950's to late 1960's with a brief and 
partial revival in the early 1980's).
b. by definition postwar economies are not stable. In SSA and Asia most were very poor and 
fragile to start and are prone to climatic and exogenous economic shocks while having few 
resource margins (domestic or external) on which to draw to alleviate shock impact. 
Superimposed on that basic set o f weakness and uncertainties which are exacerbated as to 
possible full or partial, national or district continuation or reemergence o f armed violence.
The first set o f uncertainties and limitations on national coping strategies apply to all poor countries 
but probably more to post, or emerging from war, areas which are initially particularly dependent 
on external financial resources, training capacity and - less uniformly - personnel.42 The second set 
are unique to them and probably more serious in a majority o f cases, although in - e.g. - 
Mozambique the greatest obstacles to rehabilitation have been IMF constrictions on basic service 
provision even out o f grant aid, too large and intrusive an INGO rule, marginalisation in overall
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economic policy and investment by the World Bank and - in 1999/2000 - floods rather than 
continued or renewed armed conflict which has simply not happened.
The most complicated - conceptually and practically - cases are those in which war is self 
evidently still an ongoing process with no end in view but substantial areas are relatively
peaceful for extended periods and domestic civil society bodies capable o f acting in respect to 
agriculture and basic services exist. The central issues include:
1. whether attempted rehabilitation (and survival support) will exacerbate/elongate war because 
it is a fact o f life and death that one cannot provide adequate food and medical care to civilian 
populations in war zones while the dominant armed forces in these zones go unfed and 
untreated.4j The case that it cannot be justified turns in particular on Interahamwe controlled 
camps in then Zaire over 1994-1996 which precipitated the Kabila-Rwanda-Uganda alliance to 
overthrow Mobuto and wipe out IH bases (only very partially successful on the latter head 
leading to the subsequent Rwanda-Burundi-Congo factions war against President Kabila's 
regime) and the Sudan. Southern Sudan’s Operation Lifeline Sudan, like the food aid to the 
North, is overwhelmingly survival relief in respect to food and medical services, so that it - like 
the IH camps - has not, to date, been primarily about Rehabilitation measures prolonging war 
but relief (survival) food doing so..44
2. what is practicable, where. Probably small farming household production, accessible 
relatively pure war (protected spring waterhole, shallow well, perhaps deep well or borehole) 
primary health care (vaccination, health education with prenatal, HIV, malaria emphasis, first 
aid. simple curative) and education (primary and in some contexts secondary) are the main 
components. These are likely to be feasible and to have relatively low sunk capital costs to be 
lost if active war zones shift and to have substantial rapid nutrition, health, education and social 
capital gains. Both the realities o f operating in civil war zones and o f expatriate costs in SSA 
suggest domestic civil society actors (community, and/or church or mosque linked in most 
cases) with some autonomy from military command structures4  ^ are the likely best main 
delivery and design detail actors with INGO's in a technical, key professional and logistical 
(and usually financial) support role;
3. How sustainable are such partial rehabilitation efforts? How resilient in the face o f renewed 
conflict? How useful after the war? Probably the answers are intrinsically contextual and
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equally probably highly uncertain ex ante. In central Somalia substantial rehabilitation in and 
around Baidoa was achieved by several INGO's, WFP, domestic civil society actors, somewhat 
tenuous local governance service committees and UNICEF over 1992-1995. All were swept 
away overnight when General Aideed's forces conquered the town -  a risk the actors knew 
from the 1993 UN withdrawal. But in Somaliland a similar (perhaps more water centred) 
programme over 1992-1995 survived three violent uprisings (with all parties very careful not to 
damage water, health or education facilities). Similarly in 1992 the Mozambique government's 
giving priority not just to relief food but also to seeds, tools, medical supplies and reopening 
health posts and primary schools in Renamo controlled areas (largely under WFP, UNICEF and 
INGO flags, but often with seconded government personnel and always with high publicity) 
was perceived then as high risk, but probably helped create the suspension o f disbelief and the 
patience needed for the interminably leisurely UN running o f demobilisation and elections to be 
possible and to contribute to a positive result.
Rehabilitation - especially early on - is highly vulnerable to shocks other than (or in addition to) 
renewed conflict. Drought (e.g. in Somalia), flood (e.g. in Mozambique), terms o f trade (e.g. in 
Rwanda) all have severe impact especially when food security/entitlements livelihood and reserves 
against calamities, local infrastructure and state resources have not recovered fully from war.
Optimally, calamities should be faced by maintaining core rehabilitation programme components 
and augmenting resource flows to reverse shock impact. For example WFP food sold to provide 
wages a) to entitle - say - flood afflicted households to food and b) to rebuild local transport, basic 
service and administrative infrastructure while sustaining the rural transport/commercial sector 
(which literal food for work would damage) is a near optimal approach in at least a range of 
circumstances. It is a trampoline safety net allowing farmers, the rural transport/commerce 
network and infrastructure to bounce back and is a route through which additional external 
resources may be mobiliseable.
But not all calamities offer such conceptually 'easy' answers or chances for damage limitation and 
rehabilitation protection. In Acholiland, Gulu town and three districts (especially Gulu and 
Kitgum) have been hit by the rare, lethal and panic inducing Ebola fever.46 Resources at both of 
Gulu's two hospitals (for 300,000 to 400,000 persons in the town, adjacent displaced camps and 
rural areas) are necessarily diverted to disease containment as are national level health resources -
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augmented by WHO assistance. Return home is necessarily blocked to prevent spread o f the 
disease. I herefore food security and services build up (even beyond diverted resource impact) are 
largely suspended. In this and similar cases about the best that can be sought is to limit the period 
and extent o f the calamity setback, improve knowledge o f user priorities for future rehabilitation 
(with the immediate side benefit o f maintaining consultation/contact) and continue planning and 
mobilisation.
Rehabilitation and Reconciliation
Rehabilitation - even plus Reconciliation and Reconstruction - is not the whole o f economic policy 
and praxis even though in post war contexts it should normally be a fully integrated, central set of 
themes in it. Therefore operation o f a rehabilitation process does have implications for priorities in 
areas which are, in themselves Reconciliation, Reconstruction or Other:
a. Reconciliation includes restoring government's capacity - notably in security and basic 
service delivery. Therefore training personnel47 and restoring professional and para- 
professional wages from sub-poverty line levels48 are crucial to rehabilitation for reasons 
much broader than direct employment generation or public service poverty reduction;
b. local infrastructure and services do need provincial and national superstructure - most 
evidently in cases such as roads to highways but also health posts and clinics to rural to 
reference hospitals or primary schools to secondary and tertiary, not least teacher training - 
to be effective. Such projects are probably better categorised as reconstruction because 
they are larger, more specialised and inherently directly affecting limited numbers o f people 
but a higher proportion o f more trained personnel;
c. some categories o f non-poor (and if rehabilitation succeeds modestly well o ff or more) 
households/enterprises’ ability to restore their economic roles are crucial to livelihood 
restoration/poverty reduction. If small family farming households do not have market 
access via rural traders/transporters they will remain poor. Therefore macro economic 
policy to ensure such businesses have credit access (e.g. commercial banks to finance 
inventories and hire purchase/leasing units to purchase transport equipment) is important,
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not via subsidised rates but by influencing financial institution policy and perhaps, by initial 
period partial loan loss guarantees.49
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COMPONENTS TOWARD REHABILITATION
The components o f a rehabilitation strategy are not particularly hard to set out in general terms. 
However, contextual differences mean that particular projects within broad categories, priorities, 
sequences and amount o f analysis and consultation needed to identify micro content will vary 
widely, certainly among countries, sometimes among districts within a country and quite probably 
in a country over time (e.g. immediate prewar/several years on, and also after renewed violence or 
other setback).
Major components include:
1. livelihood rehabilitation;
2. restoration and enhancement/modernisation of basic service access (including law, order, 
justice and security);
3. local basic infrastructure repair - restoration - maintenance;
4. market access (on at least a minimally equitable and competitive basis);
5. parallel crisis support and snapback ('safety net' and 'trampoline') structures to alleviate and 
reverse impact o f calamities and catastrophes;
6. overall macro economic ('adjustment'), micro and macro political (reconciliation) and 
large infrastructural and production unit restoration (reconstruction)
strategies/programmes/policies interacting with rehabilitation in a positive way and sustainable 
in their own terms as well as contributing to the sustainability o f rehabilitation.
7. governance units capable o f providing inputs into a/d (both financially and in respect to 
personnel);
8. involvement of local government units, civil society actors and intended programme 
beneficiaries in data collection, programme design, decision taking, on-going evaluation and 
review in parallel to involvement in mobilising human-physical-financial and organisational 
inputs;
IV
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9. relationships with external bodies (national governments, INGO's national bilateral and 
multilateral agency donor) which are conducive to rebuilding (not further dividing and 
eroding) local and national capacity;
Livelihood rehabilitation can be defined as enabling households to achieve incomes (including 
production used within the household) at or above the absolute poverty l in e /0 In the case of 
perhaps 70% o f displaced households in both the past and future, livelihood is primarily small 
farming production possibly augmented by one or more urban or overseas working (and remitting) 
members and, more frequently in some but not all contexts seasonal wage labour in agriculture or 
construction/1 Urban livelihoods and their rehabilitation are more diverse, problematic and 
contextual with a majority likely to be informal and especially so called informal wage
S2employment' and a significant minority artisinal producers or semi fixed (barrow or stall) place o f 
business.
Support needs (and need to support) may vary by type of household. Demobilised combatants - 
especially if  young - frequently have limited non violent skills or social capital and experience but 
the potential for being very dangerous if  not reintegrated into civil society and the civilian 
economy. What is appropriate varies, but the needs are special enough, and the risks o f not 
meeting them high enough, to justify particular analysis and resource allocation (including training 
programmes as well as tools - urban or rural - for demobilisees). Returnees from exile or 
displacement are almost always the majority of war impoverished households. The special need of 
'going home' has been addressed above.
Female headed households are likely to have two types of special needs:
a. bad productive ratios o f able bodied hands to hungry mouths because - unlike male headed
households - they usually have only one able bodied adult earner;
b. specific cultural - economic problems which may include, e.g., access to land use rights, to
drought animals for ploughing (likely to be especially important to such households because of 
'a'), to knowledge o f how to manage large stock (sheep, goats and above) which - especially in 
SSA - usually falls on the male (including boys) side o f the gender division o f labour.
Traumatised, physically or mentally partially or fully disabled and/or isolated (as orphans or 
old persons) individuals require particular programmes. Their present livelihood generation
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capacity is likely to be low, but except for the severely disabled and the aged, recovery is possible. 
I he first step however (humanly and economically) is treatment (which includes even semi trained 
'tender loving care in community') and integration into an economically viable household unit, 
whether their original one or a (usually related) successo r/1 In the case o f orphans the largest 
numbers in SSA may be HIV/AIDS not war orphans but the needs and programmatic implications 
are largely the same.54
Identification specifically on the basis o f pre war below poverty line income is not self evidently 
useful unless to highlight clusters o f causal factors - e.g. no negligible access to land and/or - in 
pastoral districts - core livestock to set up a herd. A literal and formalistic policy to seek to restore 
livelihoods only to pre war levels o f livelihood would raise serious ethical and political problems 
with no very evident likelihood o f positive economic efficiency tradeoff gains.
Basic services in the context o f rehabilitation virtually always include:
1. law, order, peace, security and justice as perceived by ordinary households.
2. access to nearby relatively pure water - household which may include livestock and small plot 
irrigation depending on their economic system;
3. preventative, educational (not least in respect to HIV and malaria as well as mother and child), 
first aid and simple curative health services;51
4. primary and frequently applied adult, education.
Agricultural extension and veterinary services appear as priorities in some areas, but not all - 
apparently depending on pre war coverage and perceived usefulness o f such services.
The short list is not definitive in the sense that frequently some districts or portions o f districts will 
have special priorities which are genuinely key to them, but are not relevant to other areas e.g. 
baboon and crocodile control (to protect endangered crops and children respectively). Flood 
control (more accurately perhaps preemptive flood damage limitation) is also highly specific (e.g. 
deltas) possible priority.
The particular form o f service needed/desired may vary and have extensive - not always self 
evident - ramifications. An example is draught power (whether oxen or donkeys - a choice related 
to heaviness or lightness o f soil):
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a. in some districts and sub-districts it has been widely used and is usually a war casualty since 
draught animals can provide military or bandit transport, food and loot (or refugee transport, 
food and survival assets);
b. the patterns o f use are peculiar, apparently relating to historical presence o f dedicated 
veterinary/agricultural staff and successful initial users more than to ecological or crop pattern 
divergences;
c. both draught animals and their users (at least for ploughing) require significant specialist 
training courses;
d. the cost o f draught animals and ploughs (plus carts if  used for transporting goods) is substantial 
- massive for very poor, war ravaged returnees;
e. women headed households in principle are in most need o f draught power to plough because of 
limited adult hand power, but in practice animal drawn ploughing has historically usually been 
virtually entirely on the male side o f the gender division o f labour.
The operational implications include:
1. recovering (whether from agricultural district records or interviews with farmers) baseline data 
on whether? how commonly? for what? how trained? who used?
2. determining whether in terms o f benefit/cost tradeoffs, support for reintroduction o f draught 
animals would be an efficient use o f scarce resources and, if  so, how they (plus ploughs, carts) 
could be made accessible to poor households and, in particular, female headed ones;
3. identifying personnel, promotion and training issues.
In many post war rehabilitation contexts, draught power will not be a priority issue. In Acholiland 
both some officials and politicians and some researchers and small farming households believe that 
it is.56 Pre war 50,000 draught animals were estimated to be in service in Gulu and Kitgum 
Districts i.e. about one per five households which would imply up to half the agricultural land 
could have been ploughed by them. However, coverage appears to have been patchy. The heavy 
black cotton soil o f the two districts is unsuitable for hand hoeing, suggesting reintroduction should 
be economically viable - and a potential breakthrough for 'best local known practice' focussed
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agricultural extension. Oxen cost perhaps $1,000 each. Women rarely ploughed. At most 1.500 - 
2,500 oxen have survived.
That is not enough data to act, but it is enough to suggest guidelines for consultation (especially 
with would be/returnee small farm households), data refining, training and access (e.g. 3 to 5 
women 'user teams') conceptualisation, and funds plus personnel (plus oxen) mobilisation if prior 
steps yield positive answers.
This example is not only not intended to imply animal draught power is central in all or most 
rehabilitation contexts but also not to conclude that it should/can be a top priority in Acholiland. 
Rather it serves to illustrate contextual diversity and multiple interacting issues within an 
apparently simple (or perhaps pair of) basic services - agricultural veterinary support - and to 
exemplify identifying an issue for urgent study and a study process capable o f leading to a quick, 
informed decision.
Local basic infrastructure repair, reconstruction will usually need to focus on roads - bridges - 
culverts, health posts and clinics, primary schools, wells and other local and small town 
waterworks plus police stations and other local level governmental buildings. In some cases other 
facilities, e.g. small scale irrigation will also be key. These facilities/infrastructures are usually 
heavily debilitated by lack o f maintenance during confict, as well as, or more than - by war time 
attacks.
The risk is usually not so much in repairing/rebuilding rapidly to previous standards in previous 
locations. That is broadly correct if most people go home. Even raising size and numbers of 
facilities to increase access can often be determined to be a priority after quite brief consultations. 
Rather it lies in long initial delays - hampering livelihood recovery and basic service access 
restoration - followed by over enthusiastic upgrading. Both result in draining basic services 
including infrastructure maintenance - resources"7 and creating a serious recurrent/captal budget 
imbalance.
There is a significant interaction between Rehabilitation of local infrastructure and national 
infrastructure Reconstruction. The latter poses more need for detailed analysis and more cases 
for altering pre war patterns, e.g. in Mozambique only the three main rail lines from Maputo, Beira 
and Ncala would appear to have strong cases for reconstruction. In the case o f the Nampula -
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Lichinga link there is little case for long term continued use. Unless a major coal development at 
Moatize justifies a line to a new deep water port (not Beira), with links to Beira and Malawi where 
it intersects existing lines, reconstruction o f the Zambesi delta -  Malawi -  Moatize line is not on. 
Beyond a highway replacing the Nampula-Lichinga rail line, the key highway questions in 
Mozambique do not concern the broad national/provincial highway net but what standards and 
what maintenance strategies are appropriate.58
It is not self evident 'old' basic transport infrastructures were usually inappropriate even if most 
main routes linked to the main ports. SSA does need to engage more, not less, intensively in 
international trade, e.g. The 1980's Somaliland highway grid was T shaped with the perpendicular 
stroke Berbera-Hargeisa and the horizontal the Boramo (Ethiopian Frontier) -Hargeisa - Ethiopian 
branch to Jijiga - Burao - Erigavo/Las Anod-Somalia route. These broadly follow several century 
old caravan routes: an Ethiopian Highlands to Red Sea trade route and an internal (and trade route 
feeder) one linking most o f Somaliland's towns and productive rural areas. The ongoing, largely 
EU (and EU member state) financed, bridge, culvert and other repairs especially on the two routes 
to Ethiopia (Addis and Djijiga respectively) does relate positively to the needs o f livelihood 
rehabilitation and local infrastructure utilisation as well as to macro commercial and financial (and 
Ethiopian famine prevention/alleviation as well as international trade) concerns/9
The main purpose o f transport and communications restoration is to rehabilitate market access and 
thus livelihood beyond basic food security. That purpose requires a rehabilitated rural trading 
network linking food, raw material and labour flows to towns; return flows o f processed and 
manufactured goods and both inter and intra district rural trade. The overriding issue is not 
public versus private sector but rather small farming household access to reasonably fair 
price buvers/sellers. That may well usually be met better by relatively competitive private (or 
private and voluntary co-op) traders than by state crop purchasing and consumer goods trading 
corporations. Similarly the issue is not one o f subsidising merchants but o f ensuring (which may 
require initial state guarantees to commercial banks or participation in joint venture leasing/hire 
purchase companies) that enterprises do have access to credit for vehicles and working capital 
(inventories).
Crisis (especially food crisis) safety nets are an important part o f sustaining rehabilitation. 
Droughts and floods are not suspended because hostilities are. Even low level attacks can rupture
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fragile market networks in the process o f rehabilitation. During farm rehabilitation outside income 
from work for (cash for) food projects may often be needed. Food/food aid requirements certainly 
last at least until the end o f the first complete crop cycle after war and are likely to be renewed at 
one or more points during the rehabilitation process by exogenous events.
Economic Good Housekeeping And Rehabilitation
None o f the forgoing denies the necessity o f macro economic good housekeeping ('structural 
adjustment' or 'prudence with a purpose' to use alternative presentational styles). Fiscal, price, 
foreign exchange imbalances need to be held to sustainable levels; incentives (not least peace, law 
and order) provided for large as well as small businessmen; large scale strategic infrastructure and 
enterprises reconstructed and/or pioneered (by both public and private sectors). Without this macro 
context, livelihoods/basic human need costs imbalances will remain unsustainable, basic service 
access will stagnate and rehabilitation will stall or disintegrate. That, however, is an 
interface/background issue rather than a part o f rehabilitation operational programming.
To act on the previously noted elements o f rehabilitation requires several aspects o f governance 
(largely rather boring and tedious ones) be strengthened. Whatever may remain at the time o f 
peace it rarely includes robust, decentralised civil governance with a high capacity to deliver basic 
services and infrastructure, to analyse in order to determine a policy set which will enhance 
livelihood and rural/small town market network recovery or to collect data and insites and interact 
in decision taking, resource mobilisation and programme management with domestic civil society 
actors. Therefore - because these capacities are crucial to R-R-R and turn largely on government 
financing, staffing, training and openness to participation and to coordination - their recreation 
(or creation60 is central to rehabilitation. Because ability to deliver is a (perhaps often the) 
major test o f legitimacy, these capacity aspects o f governance - however a political, technical or 
micro they may seem at first glance - are crucial to maintaining political legitimacy and sustaining 
reconciliation.
Involvement o f local government, communities, civil society bodies and domestic NGO's in data 
collection, decision taking and implementation for mobilisation, social capital and efficiency of
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resource use is important to speed and efficiency o f resource allocation and use as well as 'political' 
reasons.
The strategy lor external actor relations needs to be national. But without local capacity to 
interact/negotiate with INGO's and to present proposals or data to go into them for presentation to 
bilateral donors and international agencies no such self determination, self respect and honest 
negotiation strategy can work in a way which is user friendly for poor households in general or 
those returning from war displacement in particular.
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RECURRENT ISSUES
R-R-R cannot be reduced to R as in Replication for several reasons:
!. flaws in what existed before the war are likely to have contributed to it;
2. war by its nature creates new facts which R-R-R must face - e.g. a qualitative as well as 
quantitative increase in female headed households;
3. certain groups e.g. rank and file combattants and entrepreneurs who have adjusted to war 
contexts will often (not always) lose from peace unless attention is given and support (e.g. 
training, credit access) provided for their rebasing their livelihoods in an economy o f peace;
4. the world's structural shifts are not halted during war - e.g. the explosive post 1975 rise of 
HIV and post mid 1980's resurgence o f malaria as well as the refocusing o f health services on 
decentralised primary units with more emphasis on education, prevention (including 
vaccination), mother and child care mean that, while rehabilitation in Mozambique can build 
from 1975-80 strategy and praxis, health sector rehabilitation in e.g. Somaliland, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia or even Acholiland (where the suspension o f positive change dates back to 1970) 
would be ill advised to replicate, and have not done so.
5. certain issues by their nature are integral to war and its settlement including e.g. justice, 
amnesty, forgiveness and peace.
Resource Access - Land
Access to resources is central to livelihood rehabilitation. Similarly in respect to governmental 
institutions, to basic service and infrastructure and, in respect to enterprises beyond household 
level, to market and general productive/trading/transport economy recovery. The central resources 
for most displaced persons in most post war contexts is land. This is most true for the usually rural 
60%-80%, but may also apply to urban displacees who do need secure residence or business sites. 
However, land is not the only relevant resource. Basic services and market access can be 
considered resources, but have been treated above. Others are input access (e.g. tools, seeds, 
cutlasses, artisinal raw materials) and credit access.
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V
Whatever the pre war access to resources system, it is most unlikely to have been poor person 
friendly. This feature means pure replication in all respects would probably increase inequality, 
render wartime loss o f resources likely to be permanent (e.g. land grabbing) and - because almost 
all returnee households are absolutely poor - discriminate against war afflicted households.
Peri urban land is frequently the most confused as to status and the least secure because both 
agricultural historic usehold right holders and government units claim title while actual occupiers 
have frequently settled on ill delineated plots with dubious and ill documented transfers (or terms 
and conditions o f continued use) from either. The need for security o f use in these areas suggest 
either documented 39 year (or longer) transferable leasehold to demarcated plots or similar freehold 
together with programming orderly basic service extension (at least to the extent o f keeping plots 
and access routes for them clear - e.g. something a typical Makonde concentric circle village layout 
in a peri urban neighbourhood does not do whether its incomers are ordinary migrants or war 
displaced persons).
Access to land is partly contextual - urban (usually freehold and relatively clearly and stably 
demarcated pre war) is different from rural which varies with the nature o f the pre war system (e.g. 
historic household secure usehold vs individual freehold) and how well - for whom - it worked pre 
war.
In the urban context, returnee claims in land/improvements should be clarifiable and the return of 
property should usually be practicable. The problems arise if:
a. settlement o f claims o f elites who fled (e.g. from Mozambique) comes long after reallocation 
and a substantial number o f low income households would be negatively affected;
b. the returnees (as in Rwanda) are associated with (even if not necessarily part of) the losers o f a 
civil war and those occupying the property are associated with the winners and are themselves 
returnees from an earlier body o f refugees.61
Rural land is usually held either on a freehold basis, on an historic secure household usehold 
tenure basis or on a mix o f both. Mix cases may or may not demarcate clearly between freehold 
and historic tenure and may or may not record both types o f rights. If they do not, as in 
Mozambique's largely unreformed Portuguese imperial registration system designed to facilitate
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land grabbing, very serious risks arise for historic tenure holders especially if  they return after 
absence, the standard case o f refugees and internally displaced households coming home.
1 he issue ol secure, hereditable, leaseable usehold versus freehold has little to do with security of 
return, o f rehabilitation o f livelihoods or o f access for female headed households. For none is it 
either a necessary or a sufficient condition. Freehold may increase small farming household 
security o f tenure (or via debt accumulation the reverse), may increase ability to borrow (implying 
rather foolish banks in many contexts) and/or incentivate higher productivity albeit why, unless 
prior usehold tenure was insecure and/or credit on crops not well developed, is unclear. However, 
the enormous personnel, educational and institutional capacity requirements o f transition to 
freehold suggest it is better put further down the phasing list and probably after the rehabilitation 
process has largely run its course.
What is key - and urgent - is to record both freehold and historic titles, to set up procedures 
that prevent one encroaching on the other, to record historic rules and processes to allow central 
and local government to relate to them and to avoid assuming that any land is 'vacant' until after 
return to prevent opportunistic land grabbing. A particular additional problem may arise - as it has 
in Guinea-Bissau in a pre or inter war context - if  long rotation (so called 'shifting cultivation') is 
practiced with apparently vacant lands those fallow/reforesting prior to rotating back into use. The 
issue o f equal access for female headed households - which often, not always, needs adjustment of 
the existing versions o f historic systems - is treated below.
Return may not lead to serious conflict. One positive example is Mozambique historic tenure 
areas. There the basic conflicts are freehold encroachment on historic tenure land and returnee self 
resettlement on long abandoned - often up to 10-15 years - freehold land in their home districts.62 
In the historic tenure areas about 10,000,000 people in 2,000,000 households have gone home from 
refugee, internally displaced or pauperised/hiding in old home areas status. These include 
8,000,000 - 9,000,000 small farming sector persons. The number o f serious conflicts have been 
low with sustained, wide reaching violence apparently unknown. Returnees and elders have been 
able either to identify which household (often by inheritance from a war dead prior designated 
holder) had a right to which land or/and which household had valid claims for how much/how good 
alternative or new land. This process was usually facilitated by District and Provincial 
governments, but carried out by the households and their representatives, especially elders.
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Another positive case is Somaliland. Pastoral land (and water) use rights on return from 1991 have 
not led to more quarrels than usual and none (at least in respect to pastoral rights per se as opposed 
to 'rent' due for their use for an airport or port) o f them violent or large scale despite (as in 
Mozambique) over 50% wartime displacements.
In Somaliland agro-pastoral areas recorded titles have existed since the post war British period. 
Again return has not led to a higher or more violent level of quarrels even though a number of 
holders are Somalians who came in and got title during the Barre regime. When a satellite based 
cadastral survey was launched it was welcomed.63 In fact so eager to know exact boundaries and to 
receive updated certificates were the household heads that they quickly compromised cross
64claims. The macro goal was to avert agro pastoral encroachment on neighbouring pastoral areas 
partly because this would threaten drought year fallback grazing capacity and partly because it 
would in some cases lead to servious inter lineage group and sub clan conflict.
Uganda which had a semi registered/semi historic title system in Acholiland has adopted freehold 
registration nationally but - partly because o f the very real risk better educated, better connected 
Kampalans can come up faster with 'better' papers than actual displaced historic users - has 
deferred its application.6  ^ That should allow local government and elders time both to sort quarrels 
on return and to address the female headed household issue (to avert all freehold in practice going 
to men and extinguishing women's traditional rights on household land held in a male name).
In Mozambique the risk - general to parallel historic theme/freehold systems as, e.g., in the 
Philippines - is that continued allocation o f titles (including 'concessions' which by giving all or one 
crop marketing monopolies to concessionaires positively cry out that they are unconstitutionally 
abrogating historic 'secure' small farming household use rights!) with no reference to prior 
occupation, not disputes over or reallocation o f historic tenure, is the basic land law obstacle to 
sustaining the success o f returning home. This is all the more true because it is a visible symbol of 
a belief (belied by output, food supply and export figures) that only large farms and foreign farm 
operators could be productive. That myth runs for over 500 years from Portuguese prazeiros, 
plantation and settler farmers through independence era state farms to sustain abandoned 
Portuguese unit production and to introduce large scale irrigation and support for -in British 
colonial policy terms - 'yeoman farmers' and replacement estate operators to the present search for 
'good' South African farmers eager to leave the 'Rainbow Nation' and set up on 'virgin soil’ in
Mozambique. While there have been successes - at least in production - in general the history has 
been one o f violence, insecurity for small farming households, mediocre output trends and much 
social and political grief.66 On the face o f it return home/rehabilitation are a time to suspend 
not replicate or seek to transform such 'modernisation'.
Resource Access: Tools, Food Inputs
Seeds, tools and, in many cases, livestock access are crucial to livelihood recovery as is food 
'working capital' for the rehabilitation o f land and housing and awaiting first crop harvest period 
after return home. Beyond highlighting the need there is not too much cross country generalisation 
can offer beyond the warning that contexts vary widely.
Seed-tool-food 'packages' should logically be provided in areas of return - if these can in practice 
be pre-identified and distribution nets set up. Who distributes (INGO's, local government, central 
government. WFP, UNHCR) matters less. Second best is provision of'packages' in refugee and 
displaced person camps/settlements before return. In this variant, structures for identification and 
delivery exist but coverage is likely to be very incomplete (self or family - community help 
refugees and displaced persons are in practice excluded) and the 9-15 months likely food needs to 
first harvest are hardly best provided in a single 'package'. Loans are unsuitable - primarily for 
administrative reasons in respect to recovery
Food access is in fact a larger and longer lasting challenge than that o f seeds and tools. Usually - 
at least if the war period and displacement exceeded 18 months - 9 to 15 months are needed to 
reclaim (e.g. re-clear, re-drain) land, restore housing, plant, tend and achieve (drought and flood 
permitting) a harvest. In the case o f plantations this is comprised in labour cost (wages) and treated 
as investment in fixed asset restoration. The same logic applies to 'return home'. The households - 
on return very rarely have the 'entitlements' to secure food (nor - less uniformly - close household 
members earning elsewhere and remitting). The logical general solution is work for cash to buy 
food (e.g. via WFP and ILO guided labour intensive small to medium scale construction/civil 
engineering) to restore food entitlements, local infrastructure and the rural commerce/transport 
network.
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In practice, because such logical solutions have proven very hard to get in place in time, the actual 
system is 'phased return'. Refugees/displaced persons remain on camp registers but most able 
bodied, adult household members go home to reclaim land/rebuild houses/plant crops while 
returning monthly to pick up rations collected by wives and children staying on in camp.'1' That 
practice is not fraud, but a sensible way o f coping with slow, rigid bureaucracy to secure the means 
to restore livelihood bases.68
Analogous issues can arise for artisans and - as noted earlier - rural commercial operators. These 
are quite context specific. Urban artisans may or may not have had to sell their tools, demobilisees 
graduating from training courses presumably need tool kits to benefit. On the face o f it local 
government or domestic social actor operated identification o f beneficiaries and grants o f tools 
would seem appropriate as the administration (including personnel and institutional) costs o f tiny 
loan collection outweigh plausible benefits and local level actors can probably identify appropriate 
recipients. In practice few such programmes have been mounted in post war rehabilitation contexts 
though they do exist with some results in non war contexts - e.g. in Tanzania linked to vocational 
education.
Livestock access is often an intractable issue in contexts in which pastoral income was dominant 
pre war and most o f the herds failed to survive requisition, theft, disease and displacement. 
Community/lineage mutual insurance schemes break down when loss levels are over 50% (perhaps 
over 25%). Viable sources o f replacement livestock may be hard or impossible to identify and tap.
Somaliland's66 1991-99 success in near total restoration o f sheep and goat and - probably - 75% 
plus o f cattle and camel herds is not widely replicable:
a. a significant proportion o f flocks and herds had been safeguarded in exile in Ethiopia;
b. kinship mutual insurance systems were strong;
c. sheep and goats breed much faster than cattle allowing shorter flock than herd recovery cycles;
d. diaspora remittances provided many households the cash to buy (or not to sell during recovery 
period) cattle and in Ethiopia's Somali region there was a suitable source (genetically and 
commercially) o f  cattle and camels.
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In Acholiland (Uganda) a head on state assault on replacing the $200 million plus herd loss (90% 
of cattle and drought oxen) is not practicable because neither the finance nor the beasts to buy can 
be identified. But selective 3 to 5 year programmes focussed - e.g. - on drought oxen (up to 50.000 
and $50 million) and on artificial insemination might be viable and meet the clear Acholi need- 
demand-priority for means to enable them to restore herds and therefore the majority o f their pre 
war cash income from livestock sales.70
The cattle (and to a lesser extent sheep, goats, camels) problem is at the core o f the reason that 
calamity or catastrophe afflicted pastoralists face greater barriers to returning home and 
restoring livelihoods than do agriculturalists or agro pastoralists. The Somali pastoralist's lament 
to the reporter who in the early 1990's noted that the rains and the pasture had returned: 'Yes. the 
rains have come and brought back the grass, but they have not brought my dead camels back to life' 
is relevant to the end o f hostilities and insecurity - access to grazing land and water points, yes, the 
herds to utilise them, no.
Access to credit is important to rehabilitation - including as noted earlier commercial credit to the 
rural transport and merchant sectors vital to restore market access and therefore, the cash income 
element o f small farming household livelihoods. The same considerations apply to medium and 
small enterprises (urban and rural) in construction, manufacturing, property operation or rental, 
services and trade.
For micro enterprises and households (overlapping categories, but given usual separation of 
incomes and budgets quite possibly often two micro enterprises in one household) different 
concerns and approaches arise. 'Normal' commercial banks, leasing/hire purchase companies and 
their analogues cannot lend viably to such enterprises:
1. their operating procedures for risk analysis as well as for loan management and collection lead 
to costs per loan which cannot be covered by interest on micro loans;
2. as large, impersonal, 'they' entities, such enterprises have few social claims on borrowers and 
the costs o f legal processes exceed any possible recoveries on micro loans. Thus they are likely 
to have medium to high non-recovery rates.
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Specialised micro credit institutions may or may not be able to overcome those barriers:
1. to the extent they are embedded in institutions also providing technical and operational 
information/advice and facilitating access to inputs and markets they may be able to spread 
overhead costs over a wider base;
2. to the extent the lending body (directly or via an intermediary) is perceived as 'us', part of 
society, morally valid and that it lends largely to members or to small groups whose links mean 
an individual's default would lead to significant losses of social capital and o f community 
respect, they can often reduce loss rates dramatically.
These factors suggest a large state, enterprise or INGO single purpose micro credit provider may 
have many o f the problems o f a bank. It can probably only avert these by operating through a 
domestic social sector (mosque, church, trade union, women's group, community organisation 
voluntary small farmers' co-op) which does have social ethical status and, therefore, leverage and 
also a multipurpose programme to provide sharing o f overheads.71
These credit access issues are not unique to post war rehabilitation and adequate access to poor 
persons/households and appropriate enterprises rarely existed pre war. But with very large 
numbers o f 'o ld ' and 'new' poor households and for rebuilding social capital parallel to livelihoods 
they are potentially crucial in many such contexts.
Basic Services And Safety Nets
Access to basic services and to safety nets are crucial to rehabilitation. Increased health, 
knowledge and access to water (to increase time available for other uses - not least school for girls - 
as well as to increase pastoral and garden plot productivity and health) are relevant to present as 
well as to future ability to enhance household livelihoods. So is an assured work for cash for food 
or. if that is administratively impracticable, distribution o f rations after floods and droughts. 
Without it rehabilitation will certainly be subject to setbacks and the process may collapse.
Basic services and safety nets have in general been discussed in other sections. Special access 
areas relevant in particular to demobilisees and, in some cases, returning small farming households 
are vocational training and agricultural extension (backed by veterinary services and market
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availability of the - usually 4 to 6 - key veterinary products, including rock salt, relevant to 
common disease control in particular zones).
Demobilisees usually have little pre-war vocational experience or training. Both those (often a 
large majority) intending to return to their family background o f farming and those seeking artisinal 
or semi skilled employment can benefit from training. Food, housing, (in barracks or camps where 
practicable) and six months training (based on an employment/self employment potential survey) 
can - judging by Zimbabwe experience - reintegrate/integrate two thirds to three quarters of 
demobilisees into viable civilian livelihoods. The alternatives o f abject poverty, 'self help1 use o f 
guns and 'stockpiling' in the armed forces (practiced by Ghana in the 1970's and Somaliland from 
1995) are less attractive and ultimately more costly.
What agricultural extension can offer varies widely. Probably generalisation of 'domestic best
practice' (an approach Mozambican sources suggest is central to results obtained beyond cotton 
and cashew) has the most general quick payoff potential if  field officers are (or can rapidly be 
trained to be) competent to identify, comprehend and extend. For some crops there may be other 
shelf/pipeline knowledge and techniques. Many extension services in SSA have next to no 
adapted/locally field tested knowledge to extend. That does underline the case for more research 
and adaptation/testing o f internationally available knowledge, but that is a process largely outside 
of, and over a longer time span than, rehabilitation proper.
Access Barriers - Fees And Charges
Charges and fees to returnees engaged in initial livelihood rehabilitation are a mirror image 
access issue. They create obstacles to access for poor households in general and for rural 
rehabilitees, who have very low cash incomes even after restoring basic household food security, in 
particular.
Water to a degree poses different considerations than health and education. In urban areas 
alternatives to public sector supply normally carry significant cash and/or opportunity (time) costs. 
In rural areas the main cost is likely to be time. In both cases the time cost is likely to reduce 
ability to work or to produce for cash - especially in pastoral or irrigation contexts so that a cash 
and/or time water burden sharing arrangement may be both acceptable to users and practicable.
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Timing and structuring o f charges to fit with seasonal income stream patterns is apparently easier 
than for health and education whose point o f use timings tend to correspond to low income periods. 
A substantial portion o f user contributions can be via user committee mobilisation o f labour and 
materials tor routine management/maintenance. Even so, in the early stages o f rehabilitation a case 
can be made for temporary waiver o f the cash (not the labour and materials) element o f both 
recurrent and - especially - establishment or reconstruction capital costs.
Fees, charges and cost sharing issues have to date rarely been raised in the specific context of 
rehabilitation, but do have special significance during its early years. Even in general fees for 
health and education by central governments have relatively poor success records: revenues below 
targets (and often under 5% o f total primary level costs, or - say - ten cents per bottle o f beer or 
pack o f cigarettes), widespread corruption, high collection cost to revenue ratios, very high 
exclusion o f potential user rates even when waiver schemes exist in principle (or alternatively very 
patchy efforts to collect). The World Bank (based on ex post studies) has become less enthusiastic, 
albeit the IMF has not. Especially in SSA schemes are still expanding.72
Highly decentralised systems with more flexible waiver, contribution (not necessarily primarily at 
point o f use or all in cash) and decision taking structures at local government, community and 
domestic civil society group level do have more cases of success, but such cash and participation 
sharing approaches appear to need substantial social capital bases and institutions which are 
both technically competent in respect to financial management and respected as service 
deliverers. They are all more successful in respect to water than to health and education.7 ’
The initial rehabilitation period appears unlikely to be one in which these conditions can usually be 
met:
1. household cash incomes - especially in isolated areas - are very low while - with poor transport 
and sparse service coverage - the time opportunity costs of using services are higher than in 
other areas, often absolutely and certainly relative to cash income;
2. social capital has usually been war eroded even in areas in which ethnic cleavages are not 
prominent. While successful rehabilitation processes do tend to have a two directional positive 
relation with such cleavages, it is unlikely that joint fee collection is an optimal starting point;
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3. local government and - less uniformly - local civil society bodies are still building or rebuilding 
from low levels o f service delivery and financial managerial capacity and may (e.g. in Rwanda 
where pre 1994 local government seems to have been more about security policing than service 
delivery) have previous negative histories to overcome.74
However, Somaliland7'^  can be cited as case in which domestic NGO social actors have played a 
major role in health and education recovery with fees (and exemptions) prominent in their financial 
operations, while local governments have used urban water (largely UNICEF/1NGO restored on the 
capital works side) as a means to build credibility and also to achieve modest surpluses for - e.g. - 
sanitation. However, in respect to health and education coverage - while above 1985 levels - is 
very low and appears to exclude (however unintended) poor persons and also most pastoral 
households because adequate clinic or school size (except mobile school and community 
paramedic) for fee based viability cannot be achieved. Moreover, Somaliland's partial success is 
probably heavily dependent on very high remittance levels which inject cash into household and 
domestic NGO budgets.
Possible approaches include:
1. a strategic decision that all charges be at local governance/social actor level with freedom to 
determine timing, level, nature (cash and/or agreed services such as maintenance and goods 
such as food, building materials, furniture) and exemption provisions;
2. special grants in rehabilitation zones to allow local government units to waive most fees (or 
charge at very low levels) during the initial rehabilitation period;
3. where overseas remittances are actually or potentially substantial, systematically promote 
diaspora member contributions to civil society/domestic NGO and local governance basic 
service provision to reduce fee levels needed;
4. develop government/civil society actor partnerships to augment domestic civil society group 
service provision if  these groups have perceived capacity and legitimacy and state service 
provider coverage will necessarily remain limited for an extended period.
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Rehabilitation And Gender
Gender and patterns of womens' participation issues arise in the rehabilitation context for three 
reasons:
1. wars have disproportionately negative affects on women (and children and aged who are 
usually particular concerns o f women), creating particular needs for redress/restitution in the R- 
R-R process.7 That factor is enhanced because war creates greater 'enforced opportunities' - 
men dead or away at war - for women leading to greater post than pre war organisation, clarity 
of agendas and - often - self confidence;
2. the increase (often o f  the order o f 5% to 25%) o f female headed rural households during civil 
wars requires attention to women's access to land as a foundation for livelihood opportunities if 
these households including their children are not to be locked into absolute poverty;
3. time, attitudes and knowledge (including knowledge by women returning home) have not stood 
still during war. Therefore, the replication o f pre war social, economic and household relations 
will rarely be desirable and often would be impracticable.
In principle a fourth category would be inequitable, oppressive or iniquitous gender relations which 
had been significant contributing causes to war. In practice such relations have indeed existed in 
some contexts, but do not appear in themselves to have contributed to armed conflict.
The most general gender 'issue' requiring special attention and priority is the increased proportion 
o f female headed households. These - unless headed by wage employed full or semi professionals 
- are particularly likely to be caught in an absolute poverty trap. The reason is not primarily that 
they are female headed, but that they have a poor able bodied hands to earn/hungry mouths to 
feed ratio because they are overwhelmingly single able bodied adult/multiple dependent (children,
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disabled, aged) households. This indicates a need not just for access to land but also for 
techniques/technology to reduce the working time availability disadvantages facing these 
households. These are likely to be context specific:
a. the example o f animal traction power and the complexities o f introducing it have been 
discussed in other sections o f this paper;
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b. increased access to nearby water saves womens' and girls' time for household, directly income 
generating, educational and other purposes;
c. small scale, inexpensive units to mill maize, decorticate millet and sorghum, crush oilseeds can 
offer reduced labour time, low cost (versus shop purchase) nutritious weaning food and cash 
income if  training, microcredit and womens's self organisation can be promoted jointly.
None of the above relate only to female headed households or only in the context o f rehabilitation. 
All are o f special concern to women and to children because they fall almost totally on the female 
side o f African gender divisions o f labour and o f incomes (and children - except in many cases for 
school fees - on the female side o f budget obligations). Evidently when successful such 
innovations benefit not so poor households (including their male members) in non war contexts. 
The reason for their coverage here is that they and similar innovations and access broadening 
discussed above can be o f particular benefit to female headed households in rehabilitation 
processes.
Rehabilitation is not a magic bullet - given what came before an unsettling analogy! - to resolve 
all issues and to reverse all inequities. Rehabilitation - and even R-R-R- agendas - are not identical 
to gender agendas even if they overlap. Rehabilitation's contribution lies primarily in the areas of 
livelihood and access empowerment. To play those roles effectively, requires attention to actual 
gender divisions o f labour, o f household budget obligations on input o f labour time and meeting 
certain cash expenditure categories and claims on labour time and categories o f cash income 
receipt. African household budget patterns vary widely, but are rarely one household/one budget 
forms and similarly while gender obligations/claims balances are frequently highly unequal, 
unilateral male claim/female obligation patterns are virtually unknown. For example, in some 
contexts increased male calls for female labour input into crops whole sale proceeds the men keep 
have resulted in parallel food crop (for household use or sale with proceeds to women) labour 
inputs from men or the husband paying wages to his wife directly or via a more complex multi
79household circuit.
Because patterns vary - e.g. as to whether men or women are obligated to pay school fees - the 
determination o f gender impact o f particular measures requires contextual knowledge. Division of 
labour patterns - e.g. that girls and women collect water and do routine water point (and household) 
maintenance but men do contribute in cash and labour to water system initial construction - also
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can have a major impact on the gender gains division o f particular programmes. Given the labour 
time scarcity in many female headed households noted above, rehabilitation measures should seek 
to balance labour savings in favour o f  women.
While access to resources (including basic services) and economic opportunities is probably the 
focal rehabilitation contribution to gender issues, empowerment on one front can be relevant to 
others. For example, because water collection, water point maintenance and 
collection/management o f water use area are 'womens' work' (with male mobilisation usually 
limited to labour and/or cash to establish facilities), men may well accept women taking a leading 
role in User Committees to manage - maintain - collect funds for spares and servicing by technical 
personnel. In turn success by women in one area is likely - not certain - to lead to increased access 
to leadership roles in others.
Food Aid - Uses And Problems
Food aid and its relation to food security are recurrent issues in respect to rehabilitation as well as 
to survival assistance during catastrophes or calamities. The debate tends to comprise several sub­
issues:
a. national physical availability and capacity to distribute related to hungry household 
entitlements (which may lead to similar conclusions in the case o f very poor persons in a poor, 
food short, war torn - whether at war or just after - context);
b. quantity o f food provided versus timing (i.e. late food aid may fail to avert dearth or even 
famine, but later damage farming household income recovery in a subsequent good harvest year 
during which the late 'aid' creates a glut);
c. appropriate place and timing o f food supply to returnee households vs. the nai've argument that 
0 to 6 months food provided at camps for use after 'return home' will normally be adequate;
d. balancing administrative feasibility, avoidance o f leakage and support for (damage to) 
commercial food network in evaluating issuing rations, providing food for work, employing to 
work for cash for food. Failure to recognise that, when feasible, the last should have the most 
positive impact on infrastructure and rural commercial sector rehabilitation and - if  paralleled
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by food rations and/or meals (perhaps via local domestic social actions to aged, disabled and 
other unable to work groups - should have few offsetting negative effects is likely to lead to 
poorer actual than possible programmes.
True the case for food aid rests on two assumptions:
1. food aid is given for mixed reasons (including Northern farmer interests) and its termination 
would not lead to substantial increases in cash grants;
2. in some countries food aid is harder to divert and more likely to reach poor persons than is 
cash.
The first proposition almost certainly is valid - in whole or in large part - for the USA, the EU and a 
majority o f its members and for Canada, Australia and Japan. The second is not as robust as it 
might seem - the potential for diversion o f food and the leakiness o f food delivery pipelines can be 
very high - but is at least partly valid.
The general - subject to contextual modification - rehabilitation position vis a vis food aid may 
include:
1. Rehabilitation usually requires substantial external grant inputs into countries/regions with 
substantial overall physical shortages o f food. Therefore grant food aid in basic staples or 
readily saleable deficit commodities (e.g. sugar, vegetable oil, dried milk) can be useful;
2. Food aid to be clearly positive requires a strategy for appropriate timing and location of 
delivery over the rehabilitation process with by steps to achieve provider compliance (as to 
amount, timing and quality and actual recipient logistical and delivery implementation capacity.
3. building interaction among rehabilitation process infrastructure renewal, rural 
commercial network recovery, household cash income regeneration and 
household/personal food entitlements by selling donated food to provide cash for wages 
and tools in support of seasonal employment for returning households;80
40
Governance And All That
Governance issues raised repeatedly in the R-R-R context include:
a. capacity and efficiency
b. probity and user friendliness;
c. participation and decentralisation
d. community, local government, central government, INGO, external agency relationships.
Capacity' is clearly a functional issue. Most post conflict governments, especially in rural areas 
which were previously conflict or insurgent controlled zones, are weak in respect to personnel and 
institutional capacity. All are weak financially and, almost always, logistically. R-R-R - not least 
in food security - and even sketchy basic service access in 'return home' poses heavy, complex and 
largely new burdens.
The central issue is how to restore capacity (especially if it had collapsed pre war or the war had 
extended for half a decade or more). None o f the R-R-R heads is one in which there is room for 
total spin-off to the household, civil society and/or enterprise sectors.
But in the short run the goals of capacity building and dependence reduction may well not 
coincide. Rapid external - agency and INGO - injections are simpler to organise (although 
much more expensive per unit o f services delivered)81 than local social actor or government 
capacity restoration. In principle they can complement current public and domestic NGO activity 
and train personnel for them. In practice there is a high risk of their substituting for, 
fragmenting and eroding domestic capacity - both public and private. Contextual patterns vary 
widely - Uganda (Acholiland) and Somaliland appear to have achieved broadly complementary and 
capacity building relationships82 whereas UNOSOM in Somalia83 and most - not all - 
INGO's/agencies in Mozambique illustrate a substitution, fragmentation and erosion process.84
In respect to rehabilitation capacity the issue is not the need for greater efficiency but how to define 
efficiency (or efficiencies?)- within a cost ceiling? unit cost o f services? number o f units of 
services delivered? lives saved? degree o f poverty reduction? All can be valid targets, but 
efficiency toward one may entail a negative tradeoff with another. Similarly present capacity and
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capacity building - i.e. present and future efficiency may well have tradeoffs (especially in 
centrality and pervasiveness o f foreign institutional and personnel roles).
Capacity is not only a technical question - it goes to the heart of political legitimacy. A
government perceived as unable to provide an absence o f recurrent violence and disorder at least 
significant health, education and water services and calamity alleviation oriented food security will 
- at the best - have conditional and challenged legitimacy. Improved service delivery - in 
coverage and in quality - can consolidate, deepen and broaden legitimacy. Both African 
governments and insurgents often act on that premise - targeting basic services and food 
security logistics, to protect on the government side and to destroy (including mutilation, 
kidnapping and killing o f personnel) on the insurgent.85
Probity (absence o f pervasive corruption especially when it limits and distorts access as well as
leaking away resources) and user friendliness (a civilian police force open to the public and
perceived as seeking to avert disorder and violence and to catch as well as deter criminals - as in 
86  •Somaliland - is an example) are objectives which most R-R-R users, most SSA governments and 
most outside agencies and INGO's endorse. The differences relate to interpretation o f causes, to 
priorities and to workable means to improve matters.
'Corruption' by personnel paid much less than the household poverty line wage is arguably a form 
o f 'privatised, decentralised, flexible' user fees enforced by'need'. While undesirable, it may 
have limited distorting effects and be better than having no staff on the job. The only cure involves 
phased recovery o f wages to the household basic poverty line parallel to training, professional and 
procedural regulations and provision o f better tools for the job'. Pay is not a sufficient condition 
to restore probity and enhance efficiency but it is - except in the very short term - a necessary' one.
'User Friendliness' - as perceived by users - who do not necessarily have identical perceptions to 
expatriate, or even highly educated urban based national, experts - is a factor in capacity to deliver 
useful services, in efficiency (useful service unity cost) and in rehabilitation legitimacy. It appears 
to be highly contextual in part relating to what was delivered - and valued - before the war and to
87perceived beneficiary groups.
Accountability is sometimes linked to probity and sometimes to participation/user friendliness. 
Perhaps oddly it is less frequently viewed as a background from which to increase efficiency.
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Accountability - especially in community R-R-R contexts - should begin literally. The presentation 
o f oral and written verbal and numerical accounts (in the technical sense). Without these civil 
society (and senior officials or politicians) cannot 'call to account', identify areas o f gross 
inefficiency (in respect to their goals) and pinpoint opportunities for reallocation (away from - 
probably 'traditional' - activities o f low or low immediate priority to potential users, or non-users as 
the case may be).
Decentralisation is frequently (perhaps usually in SSA) persued on two points: deconcentration 
of central government operations with more delegated authority to act at provincial, district and 
city level and decentratisation to elected local governance units.88 The logic appears to be that 
new or renewed local government units cannot, or cannot yet administer large programmes or 
large units and therefore - for speed, flexibility, user friendliness reasons - local governance needs 
parallel decentralised central government units. While - especially in R-R-R contexts - there is a 
not inconsiderable element o f realism to this logic it is also arguable that political and official 
(professional/bureaucratic power division) conflicts o f interest play a large role.
Whether new institutions and especially two parallel sets are a resource allocation priority under R- 
R-R depends on the context both as to what functioning institutions exist, how close to the civil 
society pre war institutions were and whether (as in Mozambique89) war has led to substantial de 
facto  deconcentration to provinces and districts.
Participation should go beyond consultation (even if the latter is taken into account in 
programme design) and approach co-determination, especially when local government structures 
are weak. The case for it is three fold: efficiency in programme and project selection, design and 
operation (ordinary local households know a great deal which officials and experts do not, as well 
as sometimes visa versa); mobilisation of user community resources to augment governmental 
(much more practicable when users feel their views are taken into account and they share in 
management); good governance (which as normally defined, goes beyond elections, accountability 
as to use o f funds and petitioning).
The problems with instituting, sustaining and building participation turn on the fact that it has 
significant time costs - before decisions and their implementation and to all those participating. 
External actors - however pro participation in principle - clearly resent the delays; officials and 
professionals are none too keen to spend many hours in dialogue; poor households and women in
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particular are short o f time so that participation often has quite high opportunity costs for them and 
will not be sustained unless payoffs are apparent.
1 he immediate aftermath o f war is a time at which participation can be especially valuable:
1. those returning home can help fill in both pre war baseline data (likely to have been 
incomplete and/or lost) and a revived baseline for the present deteriorated position;
2. they can also indicate their capacities, lacks and priorities as a set o f parameters within which 
to allocate resources more efficiently from broad strategy to programmatic, policy and project 
packages;
3. as well as indicating what material and labour contributions to cost sharing and what work 
for cash for food time are likely to be available.
This process, at least first time around, needs to be rapid even at the expense o f approximation of 
data (which can later be refined by further rounds o f dialogue) and use o f less than optimal 
survey/observation techniques. The results will usually include 'non obvious' - particularly 
historical and environmental context linked - elements.
External-Civil Society-Government Interaction
In rehabilitation (in some cases unlike survival support) the case for domestic leadership 
combined with supporting (hopefully on a medium term phase down basis) external actor 
participation is strong. Sustainability cannot be based on permanent external dominance in finance, 
top personnel, knowledge and research. Rehabilitation is not a very fashionable area in the first 
phase and tends to have a short shelf life - e.g. no war for two years, no real external memory o f the 
need for rehabilitation may not be an unreasonable rule o f thumb.
Government to government (at strategic priorities and transfer levels) negotiated agreements on 
broad 3 to 6 year programmes with main policy, sectoral and project clusters identified may be the 
most feasible route to a coordinated, medium term approach with pre determined phasing from
90external and domestic sources.
Governmental (and IFI) services - except for special small project funds41 which can be very useful 
within a strategic frame but are unlikely to form an adequate whole - are bureaucratically and in
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respect to personnel ill fitted to negotiating with and - less uniformly - to working alongside local 
government and domestic social sector (whether religious group, women's organisation, domestic 
NGO or trade/peasants' union) actors because o f contextual, language, accounting, knowledge and 
outlook barriers.
In theory INGO's should be able to work both with domestic governments and with local social 
sector actors. In practice this is by no means uniformly the case either in all countries or for all 
INGOs. Action Aid. CIIR, in many cases Oxfam, and SCF and - among international agencies 
which to a degree operate on the ground in the South (and raise funds in the North) as if they were 
INGOs - UNICEF are evidence that the theory is not totally aberrant. Others - e.g. World Vision, 
Medicins sans Frontieres (France)92, CARE (USA) - are evidence that disastrous fragmentation and 
erosion o f domestic capacity (both government and social actor) can result.
The negative result is particularly likely if  there is an 'overload' o f external funds designated for use 
via fNGOs, weak government capacity to negotiate (frequently because o f lack o f alternative 
resource flows, not o f negotiators nor o f ability to design programmes) and/or domestic social 
actors whose outlook, style and bureaucratic/managerial process are very different from those of 
INGOs and whose desperate need for financial resources, training and - usually - specialised 
personnel9’ makes bargaining between each o f them and a large INGO no less unequal than 
between a weak national government and the World Bank or its largest bilateral aid agency partner. 
This catalogue o f problems is not in itself anybody's 'fault' - it is a consequence o f past war and 
present inherent inequality o f bargaining strength. But it is a warning to seek to include:
a. honest dialogue - including two way criticism - to lead to clearer understanding o f problems 
and o f divergent perceptions;
b. accepting that national coordination (at least during post war periods other than in respect to 
some calamity survival crises) is only possible if either domestic government led or co led by 
the national government and a resident external agency (or INGO) head acceptable to them;
c. building in training to reduce professional, managerial and accounting weaknesses of
domestic social actors and local government units as well as at central government level;
d. engaging in realistic analysis o f buildup o f user social actor, local government and central 
government possible fund buildup and o f parallel expenditure requirements to achieve
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manageable phase downs o f financial flow scheduling (possibly in part substituting domestic 
governance unit for INGO or donor agency financing for domestic social actors).
After Such Conflict What Forgiveness?
Justice/amnesty, impunity/immunity and redress/forgiveness are not primarily rehabilitation 
issues as rehabilitation is defined here. They relate primarily to achieving and sustaining valid 
processes o f reconciliation in particular country (or zone within a country) and time contexts.
However, for precisely that reason they are directly relevant to forwarding or impeding the process 
o f rehabilitation. Unless former combatants and their core supporters are willing to co-exist, talk, 
work, and - preferably94 - live together, neither rehabilitation nor local governance prospects are 
positive and recurrence o f armed conflict - perhaps escalation out o f individual clashes which in 
other contexts would be contained quickly - is all too likely. Neither pursuit o f total justice (with 
the margin o f error tilted against unwilling or at least pressured participants on the losing side) nor 
mindless pragmatism seeking to wipe out the memory o f the war is particularly likely to work well. 
What is morally, administratively, emotionally and economically feasible is much less self evident 
and would appear to be very context specific.
If justice is taken to mean systematic trials o f all offenders on the losing side - and preferably gross 
offenders among the winners - then it is likely to be practicable only in cases o f total military 
victory, limited numbers o f overt opponents o f the new government and general stability. Even so 
commitment to reconciliation has led e.g. Mozambique (in 1975), Somaliland and Ethiopia to 
mount quite limited - or in the case o f Somaliland to date no9:i - war crimes trials o f top leaders of 
the former regime and notorious perpetrators o f crimes against humanity.
Rwanda is an exception and one which illustrates the problems which arise when the defeated side 
remains capable o f armed attacks, the majority o f the population while not openly antagonistic are 
at best passive supporters o f the new regime and the number o f accused is very large.
Realistically 500,000 odd Rwandans participated in genocide from running with killer mobs (often 
in the fear that holding back would put their own lives at risk) and up to 150,000 have been 
arrested. Commitment to due process means than on realistic estimates trying all o f them would 
take 25 to 50 years. Lack o f resources means prison conditions are very bad so that well before the
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trials were completed at least half the accused would have died, charged but untried. Division of 
the charges into three classes: capital genocide, follower participation in genocide and mob 
participation with local courts to try the last category having powers to fine, reprimand and impose 
limited imprisonment (usually less than served awaiting trial) have not worked well because o f fear 
of what would actually happen to fringe participants who confessed and faced local courts. From 
both reconciliation and economic perspectives the outcome is deeply unsatisfactory. Since the 
alternative was seen - probably correctly - as mob 'justice' against suspects this gloomy comment 
on the 1994-00 results is not a condemnation o f the choices made but a comment on the deepness 
of the dilemmas.
Attempting such trials during a war - as Sierra Leone did in 1997-8 - is very unlikely to be 
productive. It tends to ham per subsequent negotiations for 'peace with amnesty' as well as being 
likely to be very uneven justice with most o f the worst offenders not in hand to be tried.
Truth and justice hearings following a negotiated settlement with amnesties are an option rarely 
taken after civil wars - the notable exception being South Africa. Rehabilitation conceptualisation 
and logic throws little light on when such processes are feasible or desirable, let alone on the basic 
dilemma o f whether to call to account crimes against humanity on the part o f those who were 
armed supporters o f  the present governments.
Redress - in respect to economic loss - is unlikely to be a practicable twin to amnesty on the 
criminal front. First, a real risk o f massive judgements can only deter negotiating peace or taking 
up an amnesty offer. Second the judicial processes and divisions o f liability pose massive 
problems. Third it is exceedingly unlikely that any substantial resources for family capital or more 
general rehabilitation can be won in this way except under very unusual circumstances.
In Acholiland in 1999 most Acholi did favour a universal amnesty but also the right to sue ex 
Lord's Resistance Army members for damages. The fact that this would deter taking the amnesty, 
would be embrangled, prolonged and expensive judicially and could hardly make a dent in the 
$300 million plus (two thirds livestock) war losses were perceived and indeed informed 
government policy, but did not override a deep desire for redress. In Somaliland per contra where 
agro-pastoral land rights had been sold under the Barre regime to Oromo and to Southern Somalis 
these transfers have been accepted if  proper procedures and payments to the then government 
authorities were made.
Forgiveness through historic (evolving traditional) methods has been highly and perhaps 
surprisingly effective in Mozambique96 and Acholiland. It has been both communal9' and religious 
group and has been linked to trauma counselling and resocialisation for, e.g., child soldiers, girl 
slaves and initially kidnapped98 ex-combatants. The key elements appear to be acceptability to the 
community and a sense o f re-entry into the community by returning persons.
Somaliland - partly via the sub clan and lineage/'blood’ group systems and partly by general tacit 
agreement on what past conduct to 'forget' - has achieved similar results. Probably luckily, Barre's 
'divide and rule' practices meant Somaliland troops had not served in Somaliland nor. in general, in 
Puntland. Therefore their reentry as coerced victims who had done Somalilanders no harm was 
easy - indeed they are at the core o f the present Somaliland Army. Similarly Somaliland merchants 
who prospered in Mogadishu under Barre (necessarily involving 'side payments') are accepted as 
are civil side ex public servants and even ministers (excluding defense and interior). For example 
the last Barre Prime Minister heads a mobile telephone company, albeit his rehabilitation would not 
extend to his being a politician or an elder.
The limits to this type o f reconciliation probably arise primarily in cases o f crimes against 
humanity by the ex-combatants within their own local community (e.g. Sierra Leone) and ethnic 
conflict bordering on or being genocide (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi). Personal knowledge o f atrocities 
against persons close to oneself presumably make forgiveness much harder (and less general) while 
historic (albeit not necessarily Christian and Muslim) forgiveness/reentry process are limited by 
ethnic groups and can hardly be expected to transcend them after genocide.
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REDEEM ING THE TIMES: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
1 ime present contains the results o f time past and the shaping o f time future. By the nature o f time 
it contains them as a process which can alter -  for better or worse -  the continuing meaning o f the 
past and the prospects for the future. Rehabilitation following war is a process to redeem time 
to achieve broadly specified and generalisable goals in respect to household poverty 
reduction/income generation, access to basic services (beginning with user friendly law -  order -  
freedom from violence) availability o f infrastructure, market access and legitimate, participatory 
governance and civil society.
In most cases rehabilitation begins with return home and the recreation of household food 
security based increasingly on direct production o f entitlements resting on production -  work -  
sales to buy food. Those processes and its broadening and continuation are closely linked to 
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation. Processes because Rehabilitation is highly contextual e.g. the 
present if  it flows from a past successful liberation war against external rule is very different from 
that o f post (or not so post) civil war presents in which centuries o f conflict (not all violent) erupted 
in genocide and the main perpetrators remain at large and still waging war.
The reality o f repetitive climatic and economic contextual calamities and in many cases o f the 
catastrophe o f -  at least partial -  reversion to armed violence means that Rehabilitation processes 
are fragile, problematic and prone to set-backs. Operationally that implies -  if  R-R-R are to be 
both sustainable and actually sustained -  safety nets, flexibility in budgeting and , if  at all 
practicable, contingency reserves as well as pre arranged contingency resource provision lines.
Because Rehabilitation seeks to reduce the risks o f future resort to armed conflict; because war 
creates new realities (if higher proportions o f female headed households, mass displacement and 
death and because for better and worse external factors (whether the impact o f global economic 
relations and internationally acceptable domestic economic policies for poor countries or state of 
the art conceptualisation and practice in respect to primary health services) rehabilitation is more 
than and different from simple replication o f pre war realities. However, beginning with return 
home a main theme in participatory (and even intelligently designed less participatory) 
rehabilitation processes is recovering that which was valued and lost.
VI
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Because Rehabilitation in post war contexts is usually crucial to a majority o f residents and 
returnees and the losses -  absolutely and relative to what had existed -  are usually heavy resource 
requirements are significant. $1,250 to $1,500 per household over a five to six year period may be 
a middle o f the road estimate for injections external to those o f rehabilitating households needed. 
By the same token returns can be high in overall - as well as poor household - output growth, in 
material physical food security as well as household entitlements, in multiplier interactions with 
rural commerce and transport and urban production and finance as will as in fiscal revenue (largely 
via indirect taxation) and exports (plus food import saving). Even on conservative calculations 
perfectly normal GDP calculations not weighted for share to low income household nor for 
locality/community imbalance reduction and state legitimacy rebuilding may well show higher 
short and medium term benefit/cost ratios than ‘standard’ large scale infrastructure and production 
units.
The scope and scale o f Rehabilitation as well as its interaction with other sectors indicate it should 
be at the core o f strategic analysis, planning, budgeting and programming from national macro 
through sectoral and district to community project and household micro levels. Both because 
contextual realities are an area o f domestic comparative advantage and because legitimacy 
reconstruction and sustainability posit national leadership and ownership with governmental co­
ordination and parameter setting at national through village levels with which local governance and 
domestic social actors can relate (and influence) and to which external agencies -  including 
INGO’s -  can provide complementary input o f finance, personnel and knowledge with built in 
medium term training, hand over and phase out.
Rehabilitation -  like any other thematic entry point to development -  is not a silver bullet nor a 
highroad to utopia. It needs to relate to other strategic themes including macro economic good 
housekeeping (the maintenance o f sustainable levels o f fiscal, external, price, food and entitlement 
imbalances and adequate overall resource flow growth rates which is the medium term analogue to 
structural adjustment), reconciliation, reconstruction and to new investment and poverty reduction 
basically unrelated to war or its immediate aftermath.
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Selected Signposts For Action
1. Rehabilitation should be seen by postwar governments (central and local), domestic social 
actors. INGO’s and external agencies as politically, socially and economically central, not
marginal;
2. Therefore it should be treated as a strategic component of macro and sectoral, policy and 
programme as well as local and project analysis, planning, budgeting (in terms o f decision 
taking time institutional capacity and personnel as well as finance), articulation up from and 
down to specific projects and monitoring/review for a medium term (initially five to six years 
may be a generally suitable working estimate);
With at least an analysis and monitoring unit nationally with key regional/district sub-units and 
some programmes (and domestic social actors plus INGO’s) quite specifically charged with 
reconstruction even if  others -  e.g. basic service provision -  will normally be more suited to 
implementation by line ministries and local governance bodies;
4. Because Rehabilitation is key to reestablishment of government legitimacy and should be 
highly influenced and informed by contextual factors which are unlikely to be external experts 
areas o f  comparative advantage national ownership led and coordinated by the central 
government is o f special importance in Rehabilitation (as well as Reconciliation) even 
though a mix o f national and local government, domestic social act or and INGO 
operational involvement will usually be desirable;
5. With early attention to sustainability through phased enhancement of domestic 
institutional and personnel capacity (especially through built in training elements in all 
external programmes whether as to road maintenance o f simple, functional domestic social 
actor accounting systems and bookkeepers to operate them) and phased reduction o f external 
financial support;
6. Backed by pre-agreed flexibility finance to meet direct (e.g. safety net, emergency repairs) 
and indirect (e.g. revenue) loss from climatic or terms of trade calamities. Pre-arrangement 
is crucial because the lag involved in negotiating new support from a tabula rasa after a crisis 
arises will seriously impair the pace o f rehabilitation (and past calamity recovery) and can 
collapse the R-R-R process;
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7. Recognition is needed that time is crucial to R-R-R and that detailed good governance/basic 
service provision preconditions are normally not merely unrealistic but self defeating 
because without R-R-R good governance and legitimacy, basic service provision/ 
household livelihood restoration are impossible and that -  in most cases -  external finance 
and often some specialist expatriate personnel are a precondition to full scale R-R-R;
8. This implies that once a serious postwar government with a start toward coherent R-R-R 
strategy and implementation is in place external debt service should be suspended pending 
more formal qualification for and provision o f HIPC (highly indebted poor country) debt 
writedown;
9. Because one goal o f R-R-R (for domestic as well as foreign actors) is usually enhanced 
participation in user friendly forms external actors need to avoid actions which fragment 
and erode domestic capacity -  governmental, civil society and household. The massive
injection o f INGO’s with broad, heavily funded programmes at best parallel to and often 
competitive with domestic (public, social sector or private) ones is a serious weakness 
characterizing post war ‘support’ in several countries and one producing rising (in depth and 
breadth) resentment;
10. Research on Rehabilitation to date is relatively limited -  especially at country strategic level. 
Probably there is enough work on conceptualisation and generalization to suggest that -  
operationally at least -  more in depth country studies are the first priority net refining 
conceptualization or drawing up more detailed checklist. Another priority may well be closer 
cooperation o f Peace Studies/Sustainable Peace research with that on Rehabilitation which is 
usually understressed and in particular underarticulated in respect to potentially operational 
prolegomena.
Rehabilitation is frequently a strategic necessity for post war economies, polities and societies. It is 
never a silver bullet, an easy highroad to utopia nor a complete monist strategy. Basically it turns 
(echoing T.S. Eliott) on the quest to recover what was lost and won and lost again and now in 
times and places which rarely seem propitious.
The case made here is for including Rehabilitation (and R-R-R) not excluding or marginalizing 
‘economic good housekeeping’ (medium term sustainable imbalance and growth management as
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the successor to short term structural adjustment to end unsustainably rising imbalances and 
sinking growth rates). A focus on the war dispossessed should not preclude attention to attention to 
non war aspects o f poverty nor one or restoring toward enhancing displaced household incomes bar 
attention to continued progress in less poor/less war eroded areas or capitalizing on new large scale 
economic activities (both o f which can contribute fiscal and external account gains toward R-R-R. 
The real strategic issues are o f balance and o f priority -  i.e. o f allocation o f scarce resources toward 
multiple ends to achieve at least minimal acceptable progress toward each. At strategic (vs. 
marginal programme scope or project choice level) seeking to answer either/or formulation is to 
ask the wrong questions. Rehabilitation has been excluded strategically and/or marginalized in 
resource allocations. Reversing that misconceptualisation/malprioritisation should not be 
marred by a Foucault’s Pendulum (or similar deconstructionist) exclusion o f all other elements 
from possible/possibly desirable overall policy and allocation strategies.
Rehabilitation Now To Avert Civil W ar Later?
Pre-emptive rehabilitation is -  in terms o f human welfare, economic cost saving and both national 
and regional stability -  an attractive idea. While literal physical and displacement damage 
analogous to war is rare -  although that done by petroleum exploration and production in N igeria’s 
Delta zone is arguably virtually at that level -  deprivation o f and inequalities toward 
excluded/marginalised areas and peoples can create contests in which the same means can be 
argued for an reconciliation and relegitimisation as well as poverty reduction grounds.
The problem is that most pre civil war regimes have little interest in reconciliation let alone 
large resource allocations to disfavoured groups/areas for rehabilitation and frequently little 
capacity to act if they did. To imagine Comrade Ras Mengistu Hailie Mariam operating an R-R- 
R strategy to include Tigreans and Eritreans (or Saiid Barre acting in the same way toward 
Somalilanders and Puntlanders) is to engage in an exercise in the surreal. For from half to a full 
decade before full scale civil war exploded the governments of Somalia, Zaire and Sierra Leone 
were empty shells so far as user friendly law and order, civil governance or basic service and local 
infrastructure delivery went. Where this was not so reaching out to dispossessed peoples was often 
totally antithetical to the raison d ’etre o f ruling elites e.g. return home for 1959 and later Wa Tutsi 
exiles would have destroyed the self image o f the ruling Wa Hutu elite -  when President
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Habuyamira appeared to agree to it at Arusha in 1994 he was promptly assassinated by ultra 
chauvinists who arranged for the shooting down o f his return flight.
However, because o f the potential gains, analysis (prompt and at least tentatively action 
oriented) is highly desirable in cases in which a reconciliatory and rehabilitation oriented 
approach might have or secure state and government support. The most likely case may be 
the Delta zone of Nigeria. Presisdent Obasanjo and much of his government do appear to wish to 
avert violence -  to restore decent governance, to reduce human deprivation, to sustain vital oil 
revenue flows, to enhance Nigeria’s prestige and self image. Their oil revenue sharing formula 
does provide the fiscal means. Shell’s realisation that oil cannot be produced amid armed hostility, 
has made it potentially open to environmental rehabilitation and employment training/jobs for the 
Delta peoples. Appropriate institutional structures (and Delta trust in them) and dialogue to 
overcome entrenched fear and suspicion on one side and entrenched distrust and hatred on the 
Delta sides appear -  together with working out with the Delta peoples a strategic rehabilitation 
programme -  unfulfilled but not unfullfillable preconditions for rolling back the very real risk of 
civil war. In such a context analysis toward ‘pre-emptive rehabilitation before w ar’ may be useful.
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NOTES
1. This paper is in conjunction with "Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development: Toward 
Reconceptualisation" by R.H. Green and I. Ahmed (IDS, 1998 for initial Cope Workshop), 
"Toward A M acroeconomic Framework for Somaliland's Postwar Rehabilitation And 
Reconstruction" by R.H. Green (IDS, 1998 for 1st Somaliland National Reconstruction 
Conference, Hargeisa, October 1998), Ahmed and Green, "The Heritage o f War and State 
Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local level effects, external intervention and governance 
reconstruction", and I. Ahmed, "The Legacy o f Complex Emergencies in Somalia and 
Somaliland: local effects, rehabilitation and approaches to peacemaking and state 
reconstitution (IDS, 2000 for concluding COPE Workshop), COPE Working Papers 4,11, 23, 
37, the third also is in Adedeji (ed.) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The 
search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, Ch. 14, London/New York: Zed 
Books: 257-281.
2. Rough estimation and extrapolation along the lines o f UNICEF's Children On The Front Line 
(New York, 1987, 1989) which indicate well over 2 million lives and $70,000 million output 
lost in the SADCC (excluding South Africa) countries over 1980-1992 concentrated on, but by 
no means (especially in respect to lost GDP) solely in, Angola and Mozambique.
3. UNICEF, op. cit., formulated such elements in respect to Southern Africa in some detail.
4. Except for farming (which was unpopular except when related to child nutrition) SWAPO's
1989's camps in Angola and Namibia illustrate what can be done. For farming the experience 
o f non-camp M ozambican refugees in 'relative' peopled districts in Malawi and Tanzania is 
illustrative.
5. Shocks and policy errors are not unique to R-R-R contexts. However because political 
legitimacy human and economic resource availability, and household margins above survival 
are usually - though not always e.g. post liberation war political legitimacy is usually high - 
especially constrained in post war situations their impact - especially on already war afflicted 
poor, households and on national political - economic stability are more severe than in non-war 
economic and public provision crises contexts - e.g. Mozambique versus Tanzania in relation to 
adverse weather shocks at the turn o f the millennium.
6. This proposition may be less true in border war cases. Reconstruction o f what has been lost 
since 1998 is likely - if  possible - to be an appropriate strategy in the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
border areas.
7. The 1959-90 histories o f Burundi and o f Rwanda leading to the explosive escalation of war in 
both - especially Rwanda - are illustrative.
8. For example, in 1995 a top priority o f the new Rwandais Government was rehiring its 'missing' 
two thirds o f health workers (mostly wa Hutu) and reactivation o f a reformed (toward primary 
health services with rural plus mother and child clinic emphasis) health sector. The perceived 
value o f  a common, cross ethnic public service and o f universal access to a highly desired 
service as evidence o f the states will and ability to serve all Rwandans were seen by the 
Minister o f  Health as important in themselves and complementary to the priority he attached to 
universal primary health services.
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9. Well designed and organised retraining can - e.g. Zimbabwe - facilitate entry or reentry into 
viable livelihoods for at least two thirds o f ex-combatants but is not cheap. Ironically the 
lowest cost 'safe' approach is 'stockpiling' ex-combatants with food, clothing, pocket money, 
barracks housing (if desired) and permission to develop parallel civilian livelihoods. Both 
Ghana in the 1980's and Somaliland since 1991 have practiced variants o f this approach with 
positive results, albeit Somaliland since 1998 has attached priority to mobilising external 
resources to permit a training - public works transition to civilian livelihoods for 12,500 to 
15,000 'spare' soldiers (versus 5,000 soldiers, 5,000 civilian police and 1,500 prison custodians 
seen as needed by the three separate uniformed services).
10. This list is based on observations and interviews in several SSA countries as well as on 
observed actions and demands by returnees. The basic service priority list is relatively uniform 
across war and non-war surveys and participatory assessments with poor people in several SSA 
countries (including non-war cases such as Tanzania and Zambia).
11. That proposition may appear self evident. In practice, it is not. Even the desire to 'return home' 
and the centrality o f such return to livelihood reconstruction and to livelihood reconstruction 
and to geographic programming o f service rehabilitation is frequently seriously underestimated 
- e.g. Acholiland in Uganda prior to the 1999 Reconstruction and Peace Agenda meetings.
12. For a much fuller review o f strands in conceptualisation and o f rehabilitation literature see 
Green and Ahmed (Cope Working Paper, op. cit.)
13. Conflict theory work on gainers and losers from war is potentially relevant but - to date - not 
operationally linked. Fear o f loss is the key economic (and social and physical) reason to 
hesitate at the prospect o f peace for most combatants. Assured safe return home, reintegration 
into civilian society and social - basic service - infrastructure access are likely to be key 
instruments for allaying such fears.
14. This paper leans on the author's personal experience with about fifteen (including two in Asia) 
countries from operational and observational as well as research perspectives particularly in the 
COPE and 'Conflict Comprehension and Mastery' (ACDESS) programmes and as a 1986-94 
part time Mozambican civil servant.
15. While simple economic correlation's - e.g. high ratio o f commodity exports/high risk o f civil 
war - can be partial or misleading, they can also yield insites. Major commodity resources (e.g. 
diamonds and petroleum in Angola) can create both the motivation for seeking central power at 
almost any price and the means to sustain both governmental and insurgent military machines. 
Land shortage can lead to violent conflict over present allocation, potential land loss and/or 
local governmental structures with powers over future allocation.
16. The separation of'developm ent' from 'emergency' has tended to lump R-R-R with calamity 
relief and therefore with safety nets to alleviate poverty caused by shocks and to facilitate 
emergence from relatively short, self limiting and reversing shocks affecting a relatively 
limited, proportion o f a nations households.
17. The Mozambique strategic paper is National Planning Commission, 'Reconstrucao: The road 
from emergencia to developmento: livelihoods and macro economics' (Maputo, 1992) excerpts 
and analysis from which are more readily accessible in Hanlon, J., Peace W ithout Profit.
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Heineman/James Curry/Irish Mozambique Solidarity/International African Institute, (London 
1994).
18. In such cases saving life in the short run requires using all experienced capacity e.g. in 1991-3 
Somalia refugee camps with monthly infant mortality in excess o f 100 UNICEF did - and was 
right to - concentrate on grab (and house), dab (of food), jab (vaccination). Similarly Medicin 
Sans Frontieres precisely because it is syndico anarchist in philosophy and simple curative care 
focussed is possibly the body most able to work in active, disputed war zones and across firing 
lines, but the same characteristics limit its suitability for postwar rehabilitation o f a national 
health system with high priority to preventative, educational, environmental and nutritional 
aspects and with government coordination.
19. If external actors are perceived as complementary to, and work within parameters set by, 
domestic actors (including social sector actors) phasing down o f external resource inflows may 
be painful, tedious and slow but poses few conceptual snags. But if  multiple, parallel, 
externally designed headed and financed service systems have been implanted, it is hard to see 
how phased handover to whom can be arranged. In poor countries domesticating INGO 
national unit staff and programme design may be possible - if rare to date - but even then no 
firm civil society resource base can readily be identified.
20. See for example, "Emergency - rehabilitation development: sequence or detour?" in Simon 
Maxwell (ed.) 'Linking relief and development', Institute o f Development Studies, Bulletin, 25-
4. (IDS-Sussex, Falmer, 1994).
21. The War Torn Societies project illustrates this. Its flagship Mozambique study is, in general, 
weakest on economics and does not address rehabilitation o f livelihoods or o f local level 
infrastructure while its basic services chapters (which exclude consideration o f the role of 
police and primary courts) do not address the gaps and priorities resulting from finance and 
access constraints during the war.
22. See COPE papers and also "Rehabilitation, sustainable peace and development: towards 
reconceptualisation', with I.A. Ahmed, Third World Quarterly Vol 20 No 1: 189-206, 1999 
and December 2000 Disasters Special Issue.
23. See Adedeji (ed.) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The search for 
Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, Ch. 14 "Towards a Macro-Economic Framework 
for Somaliland's Post-W ar Rehabilitation and Reconstruction", London/New York: Zed Books: 
257-281, 1999.
24. In a number o f countries recurrent near war or war conditions characterise certain regions but 
not the whole country e.g. the Eastern half o f Ghana's Northern Region; Acholiland and certain 
other Regions o f Northern and Western Uganda the Casamance in Senegal, arguably the Delta 
in Nigeria. Even if these do not constitute national level civil wars (and at least the Nigerian 
case could become that because o f the location o f hydrocarbon fields and the parallel 
Southwestern 'op t out’ movement), they are central to regional macro and sectoral economics 
and can rarely be dealt with by short term safety nets.
25. It is perfectly plausible to argue on available data both that Somaliland is making sustained 
process on political reconciliation and institutional (re) construction on economic and service
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rehabilitation and - more recently -  on main infrastructure rehabilitation while also perceiving 
the Sudan to constitute a complex, intensifying crisis (or set o f overlapping crises) in which 
only limited livelihood/service rehabilitation within a basically survival under war frame are 
possible. It is not plausible to argue that the political base o f a won liberation war (as perceived 
by Somalilanders) in Somaliland is now available to Sudanese or, indeed, that the remittance 
economic lifeline enabling R-R-R to proceed in Somaliland can be paralleled in the Sudan so 
long as the Khartoum Junta lacks both Northern and Southern legitimacy and the interactions of 
and within Southern and Northern Democratic fractions on the insurgent side(s) remain highly 
complicated and fraught with tensions - in the South recurrently breaking out in violence. But 
per contra there is no evident reason the constraints - contextual parameters - applying in the 
Sudan should be assumed to be particularly relevant to Somaliland nor necessarily a guide to 
the restrictions on R-R-R in Somalia.
26. For a more elaborated presentation in respect to Southern Africa see UNICEF Children On 
The Front Line, (New York, 1997, 1999).
27. This is a poorly researched area. Fragments o f data exist in scattered Mozambique studies and 
internal papers on other topics.
28. For example, Interahamwe organised camps as bases for current (in then Zaire) or potential 
future (in Tanzania) revenge against the Rwanda Patriotic Front led government and 
discouraged diversion o f energy toward rehabilitation, especially if organised outside the IH 
command structure.
29. The apparent reason for the disinterest in general agriculture according to the then Deputy 
Secretary for Health was the difference in climatic and soil patterns from those in Namibia plus 
the relatively adequate supplies o f basic rations available from WFP via the SWAPO 
governmental structure.
30. In Mozambique restoration o f displaced small farming households to Tanzanian levels of 
output could - with direct multiplier effects - have raised national product 50%. In Angola and 
Namibia the potential was - as o f 1990 - probably 10% to 15% and 2.5% respectively because 
oil and diamonds in Angola and mining, large scale ranching and fishing in Namibia dominated 
GDP. However, in Angola the proportion o f households dependent on small scale farming 
rehabilitation was at least 40% and in Namibia perhaps 25% so that the political and socio 
economic potential impact o f livelihood rehabilitation, as well as that in many districts, was 
potentially comparable to that in Mozambique. In one sense it might be easier as the large scale 
sectors -  especially in Angola -  yield fiscal flows per capita qualitatively higher than in 
Mozambique.
31. This condition poses particular problems in respect to new governments in previously 'failed 
states' (e.g. then Zaire, Sierra Leone) as contrasted with those which had maintained at least 
some operational capacity (beyond waging war) throughout the period o f conflict (e.g. 
Mozambique) and to liberation movements which had the experience o f operating significant 
programmes in liberated areas or in exile (e.g. Namibia, Eritrea).
32. Usually such safety nets have had to be official donor financed - including indirectly via 
INGO's - but in the cases o f Eritrea and Somaliland diaspora remittances have been dominant.
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33. The 'Parliament', 'Executive' and 'President' emerging from the 1999-2000 Somalia Conference 
in Djibouti have not to date altered the Somalia situation in any basic way. A majority o f 
delegates were exiles. Somaliland, but also Puntland and Baidoa (Rahanweyn Confederacy) 
which are much less unstable than the balance o f Somalia, were 'represented' only by exiles and 
dissidents. From the point o f view o f each o f these zones (and not only o f their present leaders) 
the new 'President' (Barre's last Defense Minister) and three o f the 'executive' from which his 
nomination emerged (General Morgan, Barre Security Police head Col. Omar Jess and Barre's 
last Chief o f Staff) are quite literally war criminals guilty o f "crimes against humanity" in the 
present international law meaning o f that term. Their initial fleeting visits to Mogadishu like 
those of their ‘Parliam ent’ were covered by multiple hired merchant militias who do not 
necessarily support them politically.
34. Because of the 30 year gap between the Somalia conquest o f the then Republic o f Somaliland 
in 1961 after it voted overwhelmingly not to join in the United Republic o f Somalia and the 
1991 armed liberation from Barre forces, relatively few present political and even fewer senior 
civil servants have much first hand experience from within that system. The accuracy o f 
recreation on the operational ministerial side its surprisingly high - the deja vue recollection of 
Anglophone W est Africa o f  the early 1960's can be very strong for any observer who has 
experienced both. The will to obliterate the intervening URS structures and procedures is, in 
this case, a positive Rehabilitation/Reconciliation force e.g. in the recreation o f a uniformed, 
civilian (separate from the Army and the Defense Ministry) police force and o f a magistrates' 
court system using primarily (British) Somaliland Code Law, common law and some civil law 
elements o f Sharia law with former URS code law (derived directly from Mussolini's Italian 
Code) used only for gap filling.
35. Persons displaced to towns and (usually via relatives) integrated socially and economically are 
exceptions, but it is often open to question whether they would have migrated to cities war or 
no war. e.g. Mozambique's urban population indeed rose from 10% to 30% over 1975-95. But 
Portuguese policy limited black urban residence so that 10% was artificially low and the 
Tanzanian urban proportion (in that case in the absence o f war or famine) is also 30% 
suggesting the 1995 Mozambique figure is not abnormally high.
36. Demobilised combatants - at least below officer level - also tend to choose to return to pre war 
homes and occupations e.g. Mozambique and the two failed lulls/demobilisations in Angola. 
Eritrea is an exception because state policy is to resettle both returnees and demobolisees in 
patterns unlike previous district and village ones.
37. This is a contextual question. In general civilians tend to prefer civilian to military policing e.g. 
the priority to civilian police restoration/separation from army in Somaliland. But, if police 
have an history o f oppressive, violence and corruption there may be no great preference for 
them over the army e.g. Acholiland at the turn o f the millennium because the Uganda police 
force has (throughout Uganda) had a very bad reputation for over a third o f a century. The 
(British) Somaliland civilian police, however, were largely respected and trusted unlike their 
Italian style military police successors o f the United Republic o f Somalia.
38. See FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, (Rome, 2000).
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39. For example in Somalia surveys do not show primary health services - especially by the state - 
as high priority because o f lack effective colonial or URS provision and because there has been 
what would elsewhere be regarded as over emphasis on hospital curative services. In 
Somaliland because the late British period did feature a more robust and primary oriented 
health service health stands with water as a key and relatively well staffed ministry and one 
which (under UNICEF guidance) has focussed on vaccinations, oral rehydration, mother and 
child and clinic oriented primary services, although it has yet to restore the pastoral area 
paramedical network which was arguably the crown jewel o f the postwar British colonial health 
service development.
40. In several cases - e.g. Sierra Leone in 1996-97 before the military/RUF coup - concentration 
was on urban road, sewer and related works. These may meet the tests o f lesser vulnerability to 
renewed outbreaks o f violence and of'safe ' project designs 'on the shelf but it is hard to believe 
that even urban residents (let alone the 80% plus o f displaced persons who are usually rural) 
would put them high on priority lists. Nor are they 'sustainable' in the sense o f generating 
entitlements not dependent on continuing external finance - unlike, say, restoration of 
crop/livestock production. As humanitarian intervention the traffic circles, gutters and 
carriageways o f Freetown seemed to be analogues o f ineffective humanitarian randomness 
paralleling Joseph Conrad's French cruiser firing untargeted salvos into the Congo jungle as an 
example o f military intervention in the early stages o f his exploration o f the (European) Heart 
of Darkness in the Congo ultimately symbolised by Mister Kurtz and his driveway lined with 
human (African) skull topped posts. One need not imply bad faith or ill will to point to the 
potential for disaster in misuse o f very scarce resources.
41. The danger - because o f rehabilitation marginalisation - is that these large, long payoff, limited 
livelihood/entitlement generation reconstruction projects will be disproportionately central to 
macro economic investment policy and allocation as in the case o f the ROCS (major highways) 
project in Mozambique (see Hanlon, op. cit.).
42. The actual expatriate personnel figures would suggest uniformly high requirements. However, 
they may mislead. In Mozambique 3,000 1992-95 expatriates at a cost o f over $300 million a 
year in large part replaced 3,000 tertiary educated Mozambicans working at lower levels abroad 
because o f sub-subsistence to sub-lower middle class domestic salaries. They would be 
returnees at a gross cost o f perhaps $12.5 to $20 million a year. Aid finance for technical 
assistance or INGO's is not in practice fungible into even bridging domestic salary support 
whatever the benefit/cost ratios. M ozambique’s Ministry o f Health actually asked for a 
controlled test between a government and an INGO primary health care programme at district 
or provincial level to compare cost and care efficiency and was turned down out o f hand. As 
the unit cost o f INGO PHC seems to be tenfold (at least fivefold allowing for maximum 
unrecorded health goods transfers to state health services) that o f the Ministry o f Health and the 
quality little, if  any, better (arguably worse on prevention and education) the challenge and 
response are both interesting. Somaliland per capita is a relatively successful R-R-R case with 
only 250 expatriates (because it is not recognised), but could certainly use rather more 
specialists (perhaps 100-150), plus training courses to avoid massive gaps in citizen personnel 
when present senior officials retire well before a full scale universally/public service institute 
will be on stream.
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43. In practice food for armed forces viewed with some approval, or at least not severe disapproval, 
by donors is often donor financed using Nelsonian 'blind eye' techniques whether with budget 
support and food aid to be sold or bloc distribution to camp systems including basic civil 
governance but also army elements e.g. Mozambique and SWAPO's camp system in Angola 
respectively. If the armed forces are seen as deeply unacceptable, either food is not provided to 
anyone (rare) or substantial debate and partial withdrawal combined with food seizure by the 
military units results (e.g. the then Zaire Interahamwe controlled Rwandan's refugee camps and 
the Red Cross food supplies to Renamo controlled zones in Mozambique).
44. The case against relief/rehabilitation support in the Sudan has been most cogently argued by 
Joanna Macrae and Mark Duffield. The case for has been spearheaded by Oxfam and Christian 
Aid (in conjunction with South Sudanese civil society actors) e.g. Roger Riddell and David 
Bryll, Guardian, 16 October 2000, p20 who argue that there can be INGO and civil society 
access to most people most o f the time, are substantial pockets o f relative and relatively lasting 
peace and growing numbers and capacity o f domestic civil society actors autonomous from the 
SPTA military. Therefore initial food production, medical, water and education rehabilitation 
are both feasible and desirable both in terms o f present human welfare and the post war base for 
full R-R-R (whatever the military/political end game and outcome). In the IH case the logical 
alternative to allowing the use o f the camps as reorganisation, retraining and reinvasion bases 
was not necessarily starving all Rwanda's refugees and exiles alike, but inserting a UN armed 
guard contingent to control the camps - an exercise the Security Council rejected. O f the three 
options - forcing civilian refugees to return to Rwanda to be fed, controlling the camps to 
extrude IH/Exide 'Government' elements and letting IH rebuild it appeared even at the time - 
and much more so today - that the international community was choosing the worst.
45. In the South Sudan case such bodies exist and are becoming stronger as well as increasingly 
tolerated and welcomed by the SPLA. See Guardian, op cit, loc cit, and also passim  articles 
on Sudan previous two weeks. In the Rwanda camps case IH took good care to suppress them 
in then Zaire and sought to do so in Tanzania camps which were cordoned and policed by day 
by Tanzania but under LH control at night. Interestingly even under those unfavourable 
conditions, autonomous mother and child care and. less overtly. Anglican 'civil society' type 
groups emerged and operated.
46. Arguably Ebola fever is a war catastrophe. The strain in Gulu is South Sudanese (not 
Congolese) so that the most probable entry is via Lord's Resistance Army raiders, deserters or 
escaped captives and/or refugees returning from Sudan. The problem in coping even beyond 
the absence o f preventative or curative treatment is lack o f knowledge o f the host animal (both 
human beings and other primates die once they contract Ebola) so that predicting outbreaks, 
designing ways to avoid them and developing spread limitation and initial contagion 
minimisation are virtually non-feasible.
47. This may be a sector with potential for preparation during war. For example from the mid
1980's to early 1990's several thousand Mozambican primary school teachers fled to refugee or 
displaced person camps or urban areas. Most were in known locations and in receipt o f pay but 
not fully employed. Most were also less than fully qualified. Despite earlier internal 
suggestions, only in 1992 did the approach o f large scale further training while waiting for the 
ability to redeploy to rural areas build up substantial momentum and then on the initiatives of
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two or three Provincial Directorates not the national Ministry. The problem is most acute 
where - as in Mozambique - a high proportion o f basic service personnel before war were not 
qualified or where - as in Somalia and Somaliland - there has been minimal professional or para 
professional training and recruitment for over a decade and a half so that restoration/ 
maintenance o f  previous levels, let alone expansion, faces a growing crisis even after war 
because o f unreplaced retirements.
48. See A. Adedeji, R.H. Green and V. Jamal, Pay, Professionalism and Productivity UNICEF, 
UNDP, (New York 1997) for fuller case on the negative results o f paying front line 
professional 'salaries' as low as one quarter the household absolute poverty line.
49. Banks in SSA - especially when they have just engaged in financial and loan procedure 
reconstruction - are often so cautious as to rural loans or new credit instruments (e.g. leasing) as 
to threaten to constrict economic revival especially in rural areas led by small and medium 
enterprises. This can justify risk sharing type partial guarantees (preferably for a fee) to 
encourage priority lending flows, but neither justifies nor creates a need to subsidise either 
merchant transporters or the banks.
50. The $1 standardised purchasing power per capita per day yardstick used by the World Bank for 
international comparisons and aggregations has severe limitations for operational country use.
A specified absolute poverty line budget for a household o f 5 or 6 costing stated goods/services 
and - probably - converting to $ on a relatively free (which may mean parallel) market basis to 
have a less unstable one country measurement over time is preferable, where possible, partly 
because IMF/UNDP conversions to standard purchasing power - especially within SSA - are 
often open to grave reservations.
51. In 1960's East Africa access to seasonal wage labour income tended to be a key determinant of 
poor or not so poor household income status. In Southern Mozambique from the 1940's 
migrant labour in South African mines was key to building up tools, herds and other assets 
needed to raise a farm's production capacity above the household poverty line.
52. While the typical sizes vary, except for street trading the typical informal business has 
substantially more employers than owner managers (up to an average o f 7 times as many in 
West Africa).
53. Mozambique, for example, placed at least 200,000 orphans (including de facto  orphans who 
may have had living parents but with no evidence where they were) in new households as 
members with quite limited use o f initial, and no continuing, material incentives.
54. However, a special problem arises for HIV/AIDS orphans who may be or are HIV positive. 
Only close relatives - and not always they - are likely to accept the risk o f accepting/loosing a 
new son or daughter let alone taking in a new household member with a maximum realistic life 
expectancy o f 3 to 4 years.
55. These represent a shift in emphasis from most pre-war systems which relates to general 
rethinking and redesign o f poor country health services beginning in the 1970’s.
56. Discussions with researchers and participants at September 1999 Reconstruction and Peace 
Agenda Workshop.
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57. Labour intensive approaches can reduce cost and maximise cost sharing with returnee 
communities for seasonal labour and local building materials are likely to be easier to mobilise 
than cash.
58. Cf Hanlon op. cit. for perceptions o f the World Bank's flagship ROCS national highway project 
turning on these issues and the related diversion o f potential local infrastructure and services 
programmes to the highways combined with a continuity in not conceptualizing or integrating a 
viable maintenance strategy.
59. The upgrading o f several o f these routes as war roads by President Barre, whose aim was to 
suppress Somaliland, does not invalidate their present value for rebuilding pastoralism, internal 
and external commerce. Similarly in Acholiland, roads in several areas are now denser, more 
accessible and better maintained to facilitate military response to the Lord's Resistance Army. 
Their existence and location are key to local infrastructure rehabilitation planning and may alter 
patterns o f farming household settlement.
60. Very often both capacity in general and decentralised capacity accountable to users in particular 
were defective long prior to the outbreak o f war. In cases such as Sierra Leone and (then) Zaire 
that decay o f capacity was at least a substantial background factor in the loss o f legitimacy 
facilitating the rise o f  civil war. It would be otiose in rehabilitation to seek to replicate capacity 
only up to the pre war levels if  these were manifestly a major 'part o f the problem', not o f the 
answer. It is arguable that government supply o f cement and roofing, community building of 
floor slabs, pole frames and temporary walls plus wooden desks, benches, cabinets for 
books/materials - i.e. downgrading primary school buildings - to concentrate on teachers' 
salaries and training together with books, writing materials, chalk and blackboards is 
appropriate to the initial phases o f rehabilitation. But if  pre war district and local 
bookkeeping/bookkeepers meant 50% o f spending was unallocable because initial entries were 
incorrigibly unintelligible, another 25% went lost-strayed-stolen (facilitated by opaque 
bookkeeping) and only 25% clearly went to intended uses, it is folly not to include properly 
trained bookkeepers and transparent book keeping systems in first stage rehabilitation as a 
necessary, if  not sufficient, condition to the rapid reduction o f corruption and increase of 
accountability. 'No accountability without accounts’ deserves to be a more important good 
governance rallying cry than is usually the case.
61. In Rwanda returning wa Tutsi (including descendants as the majority o f refugees date to 1959- 
60) have been temporarily - at least in terms o f policy goal - housed in 'vacant' urban/peri urban 
buildings and to a lesser extent on 'vacant' peri urban and rural farm plots. These are 
recognised officially to be the property o f wa Hutu who fled in 1974. On their return they have 
- not surprisingly - found those in possession unwilling to relinquish buildings or farms, local 
level authorities less than energetic in supporting them and alternative plot/home provision 
lagging badly.
62. For example in Angonia District in Tete (a maize and potato basket) colonial settler freeholds 
were turned into state farms (after settler abandonment) which were then abandoned in the early 
1980's during the upsurge o f the civil war. In large part these have been occupied by returnees 
step by step over 1986-1994. Both some ex settlers and the Lands Commission (for new 
freehold grants) have called for their expulsion with obvious probable conflictual results, not
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least because these farmers have rehabilitated their livelihoods and made a large contribution to 
national (especially Beira) food security.
63. Discussions on site and later with John Drysdale who headed the survey.
64. No farm could be demarcated unless the occupier and all adjacent holders agreed on boundary 
points. This procedure rapidly diffused cross claims (which may have been as much game 
playing as fully serious) because holders wanted clear, up to date entitlement documents.
65. Uganda has a very diverse mix o f de facto  rural tenures. Feudal recorded tenure - notably in 
Buganda and Bunyoro - has partially (but often opaquely and contestedly) transmuted into 
individual freehold tenure. So in practice has historical secure, heritable household usehold 
tenure in some areas, especially if tree and bush crop (coffee, tea) are dominant. A variety of 
such household, usehold tenures survive - some formally recorded but with gaps and dubious 
entries in registers. In pastoral and peripheral areas some more communal/more frequent 
reallocation systems survive. Dotted in are plantation (and urban) freehold enclaves e.g. sugar, 
tea. Standardising, re-recording and arbitrating a generalised transition to freehold will be a 
major exercise entailing substantial personnel, institution erection and consultation costs and 
one which does not (at least in immediate post war areas as contrasted to those with limited 
violence for the last decade and a half) appear to have high temporal priority. The deferral of 
implementation suggests that position has support within the Uganda government with the 
apparent contrary signal o f early passage o f an Act relating at least as much to USAID and 
World Bank agendas and leverage as it does to Uganda government and/or interest group 
concerns.
66. Most o f the changes in tenure from the prazeiro (feudal 'knights' o f the sword) through 
chartered company to empressa (state farm) modes have been injected by war with the lesser 
recent resistance to tenure change partly because the general 1981-1992 phase o f the 1963-1992 
war subsumed land tenure conflict and partly because many freehold grant holders, seeing they 
could not secure and enforce 'quiet possession' have not sought to push their claims. However, 
the situation remains volatile if large numbers of'concessions' and large family farm freeholds 
were to be created and attempted to be enforced. The economic doubts about general 
freehold/mechanisation driven modernised agriculture are underlined by the pre 1970 (and 
apparently post 1995) record o f 90% o f domestic food and 60% of agricultural exports flowing 
from the (disfavoured) historic usehold tenure small farming sector familial (household sector).
67. On the southern (Zambesi River) border of Malawi and Mozambique literally hundreds of 
thousands o f refugees rotated from camps to rehabilitation o f farms and back to camp to collect 
rations during 1992-1994. This greatly puzzled some observers who, erroneously, thought the 
massive 'return' flow to Malawi was o f refugees who had given up and were returning to camp 
to stay.
68 Evidently return to camp for food to rebuild by many does create a cover for fraud by others. It 
also wastes time and energy on treks, disrupts families yet again and reduces the working time 
deployable so long as some adults need to stay in camp to collect rations and care for children.
69 See Somaliland country discussion elsewhere for fuller contextual setting.
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70. The largely expatriate - or at least non-Acholi - suggestion that cattle restoration in general is 
ecologically undesirable is not shared by Acholi households nor does it appear likely to be valid 
ecologically. Under interior east African upland plain conditions, livestock, annual crops and - 
less uniformly - tree crops can be symbiotic with livestock on land unsuitable for crops, or 
under grass fallow and contributing manure to tree crops (e.g. bananas in Kagera Region of 
Tanzania) and horticultural plots.
71. See J. Fairly 'New Strategies For Micro enterprise Development, Integration and the Trickle Up 
Approach' in Journal of International Affairs, op. cit. for fuller reflections on micro credit in 
general and the case for its institutional integration with knowledge and service delivery in 
particular.
72. For a review o f the general issue see R.FT Green, "A Cloth Untrue: The Evolution o f Structural 
Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa" in International Affairs, 52, 1, 1998, and for an update 
(including notes on World Bank accepted reports o f weaknesses) see N. Dunne "Fees issue 
entangles US debt relief plan", Financial Times, 18 October, 2000, p 12.
73. Water is probably easier to run on a cooperative basis because user management/maintenance 
committees can reduce cash maintenance costs substantially, the cash as well as opportunity 
costs o f no or non functional nearly water delivery are perceived as high by households and - 
like health - fees can be projected equally across the year and can rarely literally be collected at 
point o f use (albeit they are in some Somaliland systems).
74. In respect to local (and central) government in Uganda, see E.A. Brett "Responding to Poverty 
in Uganda" in International Affairs, op. cit.
75. Discussions with officials, domestic NGO leaders in Somaliland in 1995 and 1998.
76. Mozambique has sought to adopt this approach with respect to religious institution schools and 
clinics from 1992-3 but has been limited by financial constraints as has Tanzania in respect to 
religious body (almost all Christian in practice but with a few Islamic) secondary schools and 
hospitals which it has partially subsidised (as well as providing staff training) for four decades.
77. See COPE W orking Papers specifically focussed on women in conflict listed in bibliography 
for a fuller discussion.
78. Male headed single adult/multiple dependent households could in principle be a similarly 
disadvantaged category. However, it is in practice virtually an empty box. Men who have 
lost/been separated from their spouses and have dependents in practice remarry.
79. Discussions with African gender researchers in both East and West Africa.
80. Hard to do - need to plan ahead - costs are greater than pure pre food aid variant and perhaps 
greater than commercial builder cost (with no food aid) but less than food for survival plus 
contract infrastructure building e.g. Botswana regular PWD and Drought infrastructure 
programmes.
81. The INGOs1 higher unit costs relate primarily to the cost o f expatriate personnel and the 
logistics o f  supporting them, as well as to a tendency to desirable but higher than essential 
material infrastructure (e.g. four wheel drive vehicles).
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82. Observation and discussions on several visits for diverse sponsors over 1994-1999 and 
especially at the 1998 Somaliland and 1999 (Acholiland) R-R-R/Peace Agenda workshops.
83. Observation and discussions in Mogadishu and Baidoa in 1993 and 1995.
84. For a detailed - if  slightly overstated - account o f this process in Mozambique see Joseph 
Hanlon, Mozambique - Who Calls The Shots?, Zed Press, London 1994 and Hanlon op. cit. 
Hanlon underestimates the coping processes used at all levels in dealing with donors/outsiders 
whom it is seen as dangerous to refuse or to criticise harshly head on. These are by no means 
negligible in impact. But many are inefficient in resource cost/desired outputs terms. A 
common example is to accept external agency desired programmes and personnel which are not 
domestic priorities, and/or cannot be used, in order to gain funding for priority programmes and 
technical assistance. This approach 'works' but - at least as perceived by Mozambicans - wastes 
potentially more fruitful resource use. Donors may well have a mirror image view having 
accepted the Mozambican priority elements to achieve Mozambican acceptance o f theirs. The 
problem is much more general than R-R-R and does not (as is sometimes asserted) rest on 
donor conspiracy nor recipient duplicitousness but on inequalities o f power, lack o f flexibility 
and divergent perceptions in contexts more often than not characterised by opacity.
85. In Mozambique Renamo focused on rural terrorism to prevent family farming for self 
provisioning and urban food supply and on destruction of primary schools, water systems and 
health posts and centres while the government prioritised getting food through and 
repairing/rebuilding health - education water facilities and protecting their personnel. 
Legitimacy/capacity more than direct military gains were at stake in these priority campaigns.
86. Discussion and observation in 1995 and 1998. Civilian police are armed but on normal duty 
keep the arms out o f sight. They are perceived as polite to Somalilanders as well as expatriates 
and do appear to be successful in halting escalation o f minor clashes between individuals into 
larger lineage group to sub clan armed conflicts, a 'progress' which is historically the most 
volatile feature o f Somali socio-political interaction. Vendors and chatters congregate outside 
Hargeisa's Central Police Station and exchange greetings with police. With a contextual 
translation one is in the world o f Dixon o f Dock Green and 'Here-Here! What's All This?'
87. Except in open ended participatory dialogue - whether in R-R-R or other contexts - users are 
unlikely to prioritise services they have never received from the state (e.g. low stress on desire 
for state primary health services in Somalia in 1985 and subsequently).
88. For a brief - and more positive than most - survey o f post war Uganda see E.A. Brett 
'Responding to Poverty in Uganda: structures, processes and prospects' in Journal of 
International Affairs, op. cit.
89. Mozambican provinces have very substantial de facto  powers at Executive (Governor) and 
Official (Provincial Commissioner) levels including (within tight overall and looser sectoral 
ceilings/floors) Recurrent Budget. By distracting central attention and disrupting 
communications war substantially increased autonomy. For example the de facto  province 
o f Maputo Cidade was much more closely overseen and much less autonomous precisely 
because ministries had easy access and tended to teleguide even areas (e.g. primary education
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and health) in which substantial (if fuzzy) powers had been delegated to provinces and were 
exercised by those less close to Ministerial headquarters.
90. This problem is not unique to rehabilitation. In Mozambique many projects - e.g. provincial 
hospitals, agricultural infrastructure schemes - were negotiated by the central government with 
associated 3 to 5 year grants toward early year recurrent costs. The central government 
ministries administrated during the 3 to 5 year period intending to hand over to provincial 
governments thereafter. As the latter had - up to that point - not been integrally involved in the 
projects and received no sudden income boost to meet the recurrent cost burden, the process, 
predictably, has worked very badly.
91. These can be very innovative and small user friendly. Overall this may be particularly true o f 
UK operations (and least o f EU) albeit variation is high within donor programmes because the 
attitudes o f  the head o f the mission in a country and o f his/her small projects 
assessment/disbursement officer are crucial.
92. In two o f these cases the convictions o f the INGOs (neo-Christian theocratic in one case and 
syndico-anachist in the other) are central to the problems o f cooperation and coordination.
Each is humanly concerned and usually highly professionally competent/motivated but normal 
relationships with governments or domestic social actors are inherently virtually unattainable.
93. The gaps need case by case scrutiny. Middle level management, secretarial and book 
keeping/accounting weaknesses are often at least as great as (or greater than) those of 
professionals or top managers. That applies to local governments - and sometimes central 
governments - as well as to domestic social actors.
94. In Rwanda it has proven impossible in some areas to maintain or restore non ethnic villages in 
the aftermath o f genocide even though o f 800,000 dead up to 300,000 were 'moderate' wa Hutu. 
Many pre war mixed villages have been recreated as neighbouring wa Hutu and wa Tutsi 
villages and at least several urban neighbourhoods have become homogenous. The motive is 
fear - exacerbated by continued IH attacks which use resident supporters and informants.
95. Somaliland would prosecute senior military and security police personnel guilty o f crimes 
against humanity in Somaliland as well as some associated political figures, but none has been 
Somaliland.
96. This seems to have been facilitated by Renamo's practices o f kidnapping many o f its 
combatants (making them perceived as victims as well as perpetrators) and rarely deploying 
them against their own villages or immediate areas (making returnees relatively innocent of 
attacks against the community to which they sought reentry).
97. Community (almost always intra ethnic group), as well as religious, procedures often involve 
public 'accounting' of/for past actions even if compelled to do them. Expatriate professionals 
have queried these - especially for girls/young women kidnapped as porters/prostitutes. 
However, it is unclear that the returnees have similar objections if  the ordeal leads to full 'return 
home' to their locality and religious congregation communities. Nor in the absence o f an 
alternative acceptable to civil society is criticism necessarily in returnee interests.
98. An irregular declension problem arises: liberation forces 'mobilise'; governments 
recruit/conscript; insurgents 'kidnap'. The boundaries are often in the eye o f the observer and
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the judgement o f history on the movement. In Mozambique, however, 'kidnap' is widely (and 
accurately) used in respect to Renamo's methods which are seen as distinctly unlike the 
government's even by persons not particularly supportive o f Frelimo.
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economic strategy work for UNICEF, Mozambique, Tanzania, ACDESS, SADC, ADB, EC A in a 
dozen African countries.
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M ETHODOLOGICAL AND SOURCE NOTES
Means And Methods
While this paper flows directly from the 1997-2000 COPE project, it has a broader and longer 
background affecting/informing its methodology and sources and its applied focus. The earliest 
components flow from 1960's experience and observation in Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania while 
working on quite different themes and from a 1979 Commonwealth Secretariat Mission to Uganda 
as part o f the failed effort at governance reconstruction and macro economic capacity rebuilding 
undertaken in the immediate post Amin era.
However o f the three main streams into it, the first relates to a series o f Southern African 
consultancies and operational assignments in and for Mozambique and SADC (then SADCC) 
covering both war time catastrophe and post war drought catastrophe survival support and 
rehabilitation analyses, strategic frames, policies and programme development. Via UNICEF 
consultancies in respect to the impact o f refugees from Rwanda and Burundi on Tanzania and on 
Somalia/Somaliland (the first from 1987 as well as 1993 and 1994 and the second in 1995) the 
conflict oriented work extended to the Great Lakes and the Horn.
The second main input was two missions led by Professor Adedeji o f ACDESS - the first on a semi 
related topic and the second ACDESS' ongoing 'Crisis Comprehension and Mastery' project in 
1995 and 1997 followed by an ACDESS/UNDP conflict workshop in Mali in 1998. These covered 
Southern Africa (Mozambique and Angola), Central Africa (Rwanda and Burundi), the Horn 
(Ethiopia, Somaliland, Somalia) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali).
The third was COPE proper with two project workshops and participation in national workshops in 
Uganda, Somaliland and Sri Lanka as well as related panels and presentations in the UK and at the 
World Council o f Churches in Geneva.
Much o f the material on which this paper is based is published in UNICEF, ACDESS, COPE and 
Mozambique work cited below.
Other portions came from discussions at workshops and in the field ranging from a P resident, a 
Prime Minister, an Archbishop, Bishops, Ministers through government officials, elected local 
government leaders, domestic social actors, INGO staff to ordinary camp residents and returnees.
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Other contributions come from students from countries surveyed participating in IDS (Sussex) 
seminars and courses. Much o f this material is - by its nature - not published nor directly citable. 
Also not citable directly are several memos on 'what is to be done' prepared for governments and 
institutions in four countries.
Special thanks for insights and discussions and for comments and criticisms are due to Ismail 
Ahmed and Robin Luckham o f IDS. Lionel Cliffe and Philip White o f Leeds, Adebayo Adedeji of 
ACDESS and Joana Macrae o f  the London School o f Tropical Hygiene and Medicine.
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